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Abstract

INCOME INEQUALITY AND VULNERABIILITY TO FLOOD HAZARD IN
BRAZIL
by
REBECCA JOAN RASCH

Advisor: Professor Janet Gornick
Social theorists suggest that income inequality within a society leads to a
breakdown of social cohesion, spatial segregation, and as a result, uneven public resource
access. I will assess whether this social phenomenon is important to consider when
measuring vulnerability to climate change in urban, middle-income countries. To test this
relationship, I create a flood hazard vulnerability index at the municipality level and
determine whether income inequality, measured at the municipality level, is a predictor of
municipality vulnerability to flood hazard. The flood hazard vulnerability index
incorporates socioeconomic, built environment and natural environment data, providing a
more holistic approach to vulnerability assessment. I draw on socioeconomic and spatial
data from urban municipalities across 25 Brazilian states.
Using multi-level regression models, which account for state-level political
economy impacts, as well as for the spatial dependence of flood hazard vulnerability, I
test whether income inequality in a municipality, controlling for absolute poverty level
iv

and environmental hazards, predicts vulnerability to flooding, the most prevalent climate
hazard in Brazil. I use several measures of income inequality to determine whether the
effect of income inequality varies depending on where along the income distribution the
income inequality lies. The measures of income inequality I select are: the Gini index,
two measures of both bottom and top half income inequality and two specifications of the
Atkinson index with ε= 0.5 and with ε= 1.
I find that the Gini index and the Atkinson index (ε =0.5, calibrated to give more
weight to the top end of the distribution), were the only two significant predictors of
vulnerability. These results provide strong evidence in support of the two hypotheses in
this dissertation, mainly that a certain type of income inequality is a predictor of
vulnerability and that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does
matter in terms of its impacts. It appears that top end, not bottom end income inequality
significantly predicts vulnerability.
Next I dig further into the data and separately test each of the factors which
comprise the composite vulnerability score: socioeconomic status, infrastructure quality
and governance. This line of analysis yields some illuminating results. I find that while
all types of income inequality positively predict socioeconomic status, when I control for
absolute poverty, municipality size, and environmental conditions, top end and top half
income inequality predict the poor governance component of the vulnerability index, the
factor most closely correlated with the presence of slums, informal settlements and high
population density.
In sum, these findings suggest that the level of absolute poverty does not fully
explain the presence of slums, informal settlements, and high-population density within a

v

municipality. Top end and top half income inequality also play a role. My data illustrate
that considering income inequality, and specifically top end and half income inequality,
as part of vulnerability assessments can significantly aid in crafting more effective,
sustainable adaptation efforts by helping to better identify which municipalities are most
vulnerable to climate change.
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I.

Introduction
A.

Research Question and Expectations

This analysis examines the relationship between income inequality and
vulnerability to climate change in urban, middle-income countries by answering the
following research question: Is income inequality a determinant of municipality
vulnerability to flooding in Brazil? The literature points to a host of negative impacts of
income inequality, such as prolonged absolute poverty, a lack of social mobility, spatial
segregation, increased mortality, and unequal access to and distribution of resources and
protections. What is less understood is how these negative effects of income inequality
might be hindering society’s ability to adapt to climate change.
Theories of income inequality suggest that high levels of inequality lead to a
breakdown of social cohesion which results in inequitable distribution of public
resources, not simply due to poverty, but through two other distinct mechanisms: spatial
segregation (Massey 1996) and political power concentrated in the elite class1 (Cardoso
1972). I hypothesize that income inequality measures which capture the income position
of those at the top of the income distribution are best suited to capture the social
phenomena in question, i.e., spatial segregation and unequal resource distribution.
Bottom half income inequality, a measure of the difference between those in the middle
and those at the bottom of the income distribution, does not provide any explicit

1

For the purposes of this analysis, I consider elites those with incomes at or above the
90th decile of the income distribution.
1

information on those at the top of the income distribution, which are the population most
likely to be in charge of resource allocation (Portes 2010).
This research will focus on how these social conditions influence vulnerability to
climate change in urban, middle-income countries. Currently, policymakers are in the
habit of giving only marginal, if any, consideration to income inequality when crafting
climate change adaptation strategies (Ribot 2011). By demonstrating that income
inequality influences vulnerability, this research will aid adaptation experts in more
accurately identifying vulnerable areas and crafting policies that address the underlying
causes of vulnerability.
This analysis considers the effects of income inequality on urban municipalities in
urban, middle-income countries by focusing on Brazil, a predominantly urban, middleincome country. Brazil is infamous for its high levels of income inequality (Souza and
Medeiros 2013); however, Brazilian municipalities and states vary substantially on this
metric. Within the 1,276 urban municipalities across 25 states under analysis, the Gini
index values across municipalities range from a score of 0.32 (low inequality) to 0.68
(high inequality) and from 0.44 to 0.57 across states. Mean gross monthly income also
varies tremendously across municipalities and states, from R$297 to R$2943 for
municipalities and from R$586 to R$15382 across states. With considerable ranges of
both income inequality and gross monthly incomes across geographies, Brazil is an ideal
case study for examining the impacts of income inequality. Brazil is also a prime
example of a country where country-level metrics, such as Gross National Income (GNI)

2

The purchasing power parity conversion factor for 2010 Brazilian Reals to 2005 United
States dollars is 1.74 (World Bank 2015).
2

per capita and the Gini index, obscure the true spectrum of social cohesion and wellbeing that Brazilians experience, across subnational areas.
In terms of vulnerability to climate change, Brazil is also an especially
appropriate case study as the bulk of its urban population, to varying degrees, is subject
to climate hazards. Heavy precipitation causes severe inland flooding as well as
landslides, while storm surges and sea level rise put urban coastal communities at risk.
While droughts are also a concern, as they affect both agricultural and energy production,
they disproportionately affect rural areas. Flooding and landslides are of more pertinent
concern for urban areas, especially since so many urban areas are located along the
coasts. Since 2000, Brazil has weathered fifty-one floods and five landslides, which
caused 2,559 deaths, 514,845 people to lose their homes, 6,403,073 people to be affected
and $4,831,870 USD in economic losses (EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database
2014). As climate change accelerates, these disasters will undoubtedly increase in
frequency and severity (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010).
This research aims to add to the income inequality and vulnerability literatures by
providing empirical evidence for the linkages theorized between income inequality and
vulnerability to climate change. Income inequality, measured at the municipality level, is
expected to be a significant predictor of municipality vulnerability. It is worth noting that
I use the word “predictor,” rather than “cause.” This choice of language is deliberate. I
am not suggesting that this research design can be used to determine causality. Instead I
draw on the theoretic literature to buttress the claim that income inequality may impact
vulnerability. A significant finding in this dissertation thus can only supply evidence of a
significant relationship, not a causal one.
3

To test this relationship, I draw on several data sources:


household data from the 2010 Brazilian census hosted in the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series International (IPUMS) database



municipality data from the 2011 Perfil dos Municipios, a Brazilian municipality
survey from the IBGE



urban population count data from the 2010 Brazilian census (IBGE) hosted in the
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)



flood frequency projection spatial data from the 2011 Global Assessment Report
on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR)



urban areas identified using satellite data of night time lights (NOAA 2010)



aridity spatial data from the Consortium for Spatial Information (CSI 2012)
With this unique combination of data sources and types, I am able to test the

theoretical relationships outlined above using multi-level regression models which
account for both the physical and socioeconomic conditions which may be impacting
vulnerability. I measure vulnerability at the municipality level; however I also control for
state-level impacts by including the state as the grouping or clustering variable in the
multi-level model.
I select the municipality as the primary unit of analysis for three main reasons.
The first is that the municipality is the smallest geography to which household level
socioeconomic data could be reliably geo-coded (IPUMS 2014). The municipality is also
the preferred unit as it is the governance level at which most adaptation policies are
implemented (Nepstad et al. 2002; Puppim de Oliveira 2009). Lastly the municipality is

4

the level of government in Brazil that has most control over land use, housing
development and general public resource allocation (Soares 2007; Tompkins, Lemos, and
Boyd 2008).
I use a multi-level model structure, with municipality as the lower unit of
analysis, and state as the upper level unit of analysis, for two reasons. The first is to
account for state-level political economy differences (Font 2003; Weinstein 1982), i.e.,
the extent to which the political economy of the state may be impacting vulnerability.
The second impetus for using a multi-level model structure is to account for the potential
spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability, i.e., the extent to which the vulnerability of other
municipalities within the same state may be impacting the vulnerability of a given
municipality. While the state-level impacts I aim to control for are distinct (one a spatial
relationship, the other a political economy effect), I also acknowledge that the two are
inextricably linked. The political economy of a state also likely drives the spatial
autocorrelation of vulnerability, as neighboring municipalities within a given state are
subject to the same political economic regime. Given this tautological relationship, I
acknowledge that the political economy variable in the model may be also be capturing a
portion of the spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability. In subsequent chapters, I describe
the data and methods in more detail.
This work will help bridge the gap between income inequality and vulnerability
scholars. In addition, adaptation policymakers can draw on this work to: (a) determine
whether including income inequality measures in vulnerability assessments is both
theoretically and empirically defensible and; (b) whether funds slated for adaptation

5

could be legitimately distributed to programs aimed at tackling the problems related to
income inequality including spatial segregation and inequitable resource allocation.

B.

Brazil in Context
1.

Background

Brazil is the largest country on the South American continent, in terms of both
population and land area. According to 2013 estimates, Brazil also has the fifth largest
population in the world (World Population Statistics 2013). Brazil is a democratic,
federal constitutional republic. The federal government is divided into three branches: the
executive, legislative and judicial. Brazil is sub-divided into states and states are further
sub-divided into municipalities. Each state and municipality has its own autonomous
government (Setzer 2009). Table I-1 lists some key national level socioeconomic,
environmental and governance indicators for Brazil.

6

Table I-1 Brazil: National Indicators
National Indicators
Population size
Population growth rate
(2011-2012)
Percent urban
Gross National Income
(GNI) (US$)
Per capita GNI (US$)
Income inequality (Gini
index)
Literacy
Disaster risk
Violence indicators
Political freedom
Transparency indicators
Corruption indicators

Brazil
199.321 million
1.30 %

Data Year
2013
2011-2012

85 %
$2,217,452,244,807

2012
2012

$11,630
0.55

2012
2009

90 % (adults 15+)
medium risk
high violence: 42,785
homicides; 717,185 assaults
“free”

2012
2010
2011

"significant" budget openness
rank #69/176 in corruption
perception, "little"
enforcement of OECD antibribery convention (2011)

2010
2012

2010

Sources: World Population Statistics 2013; World Bank 2013; Prevention Web 2013;
United National Office on Drugs and Crime 2013; Freedom House 2013; Transparency
International 2013.
As a developing, modern democracy, Brazil has some impressive achievements in
regards to socioeconomic outcomes. The literacy rate is 90 percent for adults fifteen and
older and GNI per capita, at $11,630, is at the top of the income range ($1,036 to $12,
615 USD) for middle-income countries. The National Disaster Risk Index, a measure of a
country’s overall risk to natural disasters, categorizes Brazil as at “medium” risk. This
measure is calculated by estimating a projected frequency of all possible natural hazards
and the total population exposed.
The next few indicators speak to the quality of Brazil’s governance structures.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported 42,785 homicides and 717,185
7

assaults in 2011. Transparency International, an agency devoted to cataloging the quality
of national governance, ranks Brazil #69 out of 176 countries in terms of corruption and
notes that there is “little” enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery convention. The Gini
index, the measure of income inequality commonly used by the World Bank and other
international development agencies, ranges from zero to one. A score of zero denotes
perfect equality–where everyone earns exactly the same amount. A Gini score of one
means perfect inequality, or that a single person earns all the income. With a Gini index
score of 0.55, Brazil’s income inequality score in 2010 was high, although it has been on
the decline since the early 2000s (Souza and Medeiros 2013; Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and
Ortiz-Juarez 2013). Other nations with similarly high Gini scores include: Colombia
(0.56), Panama (0.52) and Paraguay (0.52) (World Bank 2013). Although income
inequality is high, Brazil was labeled as a “free” society by Freedom House, an
organization which ranks the level of political freedom in a country.
As a member of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the term coined by financial
analysts at Goldman Sachs in 2003 for major, developing economies, Brazil is considered
a key player in the global economy. Throughout the 2000s, Brazil has been referred to by
financial analysts as a positive model of economic development (Rohter 2012). In 2010,
Brazilian GDP growth was 7.5 percent (World Bank 2013), an impressive figure. While
receiving accolades for its economic growth, Brazil has also been chided for its high
levels of income inequality. While newly minted billionaires travel by helicopter to avoid
Rio de Janeiro’s notoriously bad traffic, residents of favelas, Brazilian shantytowns,
struggle to feed their families.

8

This story of uneven development is not uncommon in middle-income countries
(National Research Council 2003). While the gap between the haves and have-nots is
admittedly more extreme in Brazil as compared to some other middle-income nations,
this development trajectory is typical of rapidly urbanizing middle-income countries,
where markets have effectively allowed some to enjoy a lifestyle akin to high-income
countries, but have also left many behind (Roberts and Bradley 2006). Although income
inequality has been on the decline in recent years in Brazil and other urbanized, Latin
American countries (Lustig et al. 2013), the level of income inequality in Brazil is still far
above those of most developed countries. For example, the United States, also criticized
for its high level of income inequality, has a Gini index score of 0.48 (United States
Census Bureau 2012), seven points lower than that of Brazil.
2.

Natural Hazards

The Prevention Web, a project of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction, designates Brazil as at “medium” risk for natural disasters. The most common
natural disasters in Brazil are drought and flooding (EM-DAT 2014). While droughts
tend to cause more economic damages due to loss of crops and energy shortages (Brazil
derives the majority of its energy from hydro-electric dams) (Cohen, Lenzen, and
Schaeffer 2005), floods cause more physical harm and loss of life, as well as considerable
economic losses. Brazilian cities are vulnerable to coastal and in-land flooding of deltas
due to storm surges and sea level rise, as well as in-land flooding of rivers due to
increased precipitation. With many high elevation coastal areas with steep elevation
profiles, Brazil is also highly vulnerable to landslides. For the period 1900 to 2014, of the

9

top ten natural disasters in Brazil in terms of number killed, nine were either floods or
landslides (EM-DAT 2014a).
3.

Vulnerability, Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Policies

While there are many ways to describe vulnerability to climate change, I draw on
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) definition, which explains vulnerability as “the
characteristics of individuals or groups in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with,
resist and recover from the impact of a natural or anthropogenic disaster – noting that
vulnerability is made up of many political-institutional, economic and socio-cultural
factors” (Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006:79).
Climate change mitigation policies focus on reducing or preventing greenhouse
gas emissions and typically center on energy conservation, energy efficiency, renewable
energy, and forest conservation, as forests absorb carbon from the atmosphere (United
Nations Environmental Program 2014). Climate change adaptation policies are those that
aim to either reduce vulnerability and/or increase adaptive capacity to climate shocks,
such as flooding (United Nations Environmental Program 2014a).
While this research focuses on vulnerability to climate change and hopes to
impact adaptation policymakers, it is helpful to have a more complete understanding of
the climate change policy landscape in Brazil. As such, in the subsequent sections I
describe how Brazil, at both the national and sub-national levels, is addressing climate
change from both the adaptation and mitigation perspectives. The aim of these next
sections is to highlight the current policies in relation to income inequality, apart from
poverty reduction schemes. I show that while income inequality is mentioned as part of
the mitigation frame, it is only in reference to poverty alleviation. It is not mentioned at
10

all as part of adaptation policy. In this dissertation, I make the case for incorporating
income inequality measures into adaptation policy. These next sections demonstrate that
current policies do not already take this issue into account.
4.

Adaptation Policies

Acknowledging the risks climate change poses to Brazilian lives and livelihoods,
the Brazilian federal government approved the National Plan on Climate Change (NPCC)
law (National Plan on Climate Change 2008), which itemizes specific targets for both
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. In the following section I will briefly
summarize the main policy initiatives outlined in the NPCC3 which relate to adaptation.
While the NPCC law focuses mainly on mitigation, it also includes provisions for
the reduction of vulnerability, which are framed as adaptation policies. In order to reduce
vulnerability, vulnerable groups must first be identified. To this end, the policy provides
incentives for increased research relating to the human health impacts of climate change.
Other adaptation measures include the expansion of the public health system and creation
of new alert systems to warn the public of impending climate events. Increased research
is also encouraged in the area of mapping ways to minimize the socioeconomic costs of
adaptation. A push to strengthen a “Climate Network” of researchers focused on
measuring vulnerability and weighing adaption policy options is also part of the NPCC.
Although the NPCC was signed into law in 2009, it is unclear how many of the
adaptation provisions have been implemented. In some sense, this ambiguity of outcomes
is by design. The policy states that it is to be implemented in phases, with the first phase

3

A summary of the National Plan on Climate Change is available in English and it is
from this summary that I draw the following information.
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focused mainly on action and subsequent phases focused on monitoring and evaluation.
As such, it will only be possible to assess what has been achieved in the initial phase once
the subsequent phases are complete.
In addition to the NPCC, there has also been considerable action in the private
sector. Companies in the chemical industry, financial services, and agricultural sectors
have implemented adaptation initiatives through the introduction of new products that
serve to reduce vulnerability. BASF (a chemical company), in partnership with Espacoa
ECO is applying superabsorber polymers in reforestation projects to reduce flooding
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2013). In the financial
services industry, Allianz, in partnership with HSBC, is offering micro-insurance to
farmers to protect against extreme weather events. Adapta Sertao, an agriculture focused
non-governmental organization, is helping farmers in the arid northeastern regions install
irrigation systems and switch to more drought-resistant crops (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change 2013a). It is interesting that these private sector
adaptation efforts are focused predominantly in rural areas, where most of their resource
extraction activities occur. There is little evidence of private sector engagement in
adaption efforts for urban communities (Puppim de Oliveira 2009).
Brazil appears to treat climate change mitigation and sustainable development as
a single process. The NPCC states that: “Brazil’s efforts are based on the commitment to
reduce social inequality and to increase income by seeking an economic dynamic with a
low emissions trajectory, not repeating the pattern and the standards of the countries that
have already industrialized” (NPCC 2008:7). The discussion of climate mitigation
revolves around decreasing emissions while simultaneously increasing incomes and
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reducing inequality. This will be achieved through greater energy efficiency and
increased use of renewable energies. There is a clear effort to tie mitigation and
sustainable development together, and shrug off arguments that a trade-off exists between
economic development and emissions reduction. For example, the policy to reduce
emissions through expansion of sugarcane is directly tied to increasing incomes for
ethanol producers by expanding sales to international markets.
When it comes to adaptation however, there is a slightly different framing.
Efforts to reduce vulnerability by increasing incomes are clearly in line with a sustainable
development agenda. However, the specific adaptation programs cited in the policy
document do not focus on reducing vulnerability through income generation. Instead, the
adaptation policies are housed outside of the sustainable development framework. The
adaptation policies focus on research, expanding emergency alert systems and increasing
public health services. While public health policies do serve to increase the assets and
options for vulnerable populations, they are not specifically targeted at reducing income
inequality. They are listed as separate policies aimed at aiding the most vulnerable
segments of the population. The government appears to see a clear pathway for how
mitigation efforts can help reduce income inequality; however, adaptation policies do not
include provisions for income inequality reduction. As such, income inequality is framed
as a social problem but not directly related to increased vulnerability to climate change.
Instead, they are considered as two separate social problems.
In contrast to the adaptation effort recommendations listed in the NPCC, which
omit both income generation opportunities and income inequality reduction strategies,
private sector initiatives do place income generation for the poor at the heart of their
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adaptation efforts. For example, sales of micro-insurance will theoretically increase
profits to both financial services firms (directly through sales of the new product) and
farmers (indirectly by mitigating risk of expansion). Farmers who switch to droughtresistant crops will have more income security.
The NPCC does recognize income inequality as a social problem. It does not,
however, directly acknowledge a link between income inequality and vulnerability to
climate change. The adaptation polices listed in the policy document focus mainly on
researching potential negative health impacts of climate change, rather than on reducing
the existing health disparities between rich and poor. One exception is the listed
adaptation effort to expand health services. However, this adaptation effort is cited as a
way to protect vulnerable populations from extreme climate events, rather than an
attempt to reduce the inequality of health services in general.
In sum, in the NPCC, there is little focus on adaptation polices that aim to
explicitly increase incomes for the poor or reduce income inequality. The private sector
adaptation efforts are more specifically focused on reducing inequality by increasing
and/or protecting incomes of poor farmers. Micro-insurance products and droughtresistant crops should allow farmers to grow their businesses, resulting in increased
yields and profits.
While the NPCC is a national law passed by the federal government, it is the
municipality governments who are most actively engaged in promoting and
implementing specific adaptation efforts. In 2009, the city council of São Paolo approved
law 14.933 (São Paulo State Government 2009), which focuses on both greenhouse gas
emissions reduction and adaptation measures (Robinson 2009).
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The adaptation plan described in law 14.933 is comprised of three main
initiatives: research, education and preparedness. The research element mandates more
climate change research focused on rapid detection and monitoring of climate changes.
The public health education program is centered on malaria and dengue fever prevention,
and the preparedness program is geared toward preparing civil defense forces to both
prevent and respond to emergencies.
There was not clear evidence of implementation of adaptation initiatives
described in law 14.933. In a 2011 report by Siemens (2013), Alda Marco Antonio,
deputy mayor of São Paulo, was quoted as having the goal of transforming São Paulo into
a low carbon city. Alda Marco Antonio made no mention of goals specifically related to
adaptation. Similar to the national plan, income inequality and income generation for the
poor are clearly absent from adaptation polices outlined at the municipality level for São
Paulo.
5.

Mitigation Polices

While this dissertation is mainly concerned with adaptation, it is helpful to
understand how Brazil has addressed mitigation as well. When faced with limited
resources, governments favor mitigation over adaptation policies, as mitigation policies
are often concerned with reaping the benefits, while adaptation efforts are focused on
minimizing the costs (Kane and Shogren 2000). Brazil is no exception. The bulk of
policies, at both the national and municipality level, focus on mitigation (Puppim de
Oliveira 2009).
A key mitigation policy initiative outlined in the NPCC is the National Energy
Efficiency Policy. It is expected to result in a 10 percent reduction in energy consumption
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by 2030. The reduction will be achieved through a host of efficiency measures across
several industries such as manufacturing, agriculture, and waste management. Specific
projects include: increase of sustainable charcoal usage to replace coal in iron
manufacturing, replacement of one million antiquated refrigerators per year, encouraging
use of solar powered water heating systems, increase in recycling by 20 percent by 2015,
incentives for sustainable agricultural practices, and increases in usage of renewable
energy sources such as sugar cane and solar.
In addition to the National Energy Efficiency Policy, the NPCC also includes a
National Agro-Energy Plan. The stated goal of this policy is “carrying out research,
development, innovation and the transfer of technology to guarantee agro-energy chains
sustainability and competitiveness” (NPCC 2008:14). This will involve expanding
ethanol production and encouraging broader international ethanol consumption.
Reducing deforestation is also a key part of the NPCC. The stated target is to
reduce the average (1996-2005) deforestation rate by 30 percent by 2013 and by an
additional 30 percent by 2017. The Amazon Fund and the Climate Fund were established
to finance programs aimed at deforestation reduction.
Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25
percent, mainly through reduction of deforestation in the Amazon. Although overall
GHG emissions declined, over the same period, emissions from production and
consumption increased by 50 percent. This was due largely to increases in diesel
consumption, oil refining and the percentage of electricity generated from fossil fuels
(Viola 2013).
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Similar to adaptation policies, the municipality governments are most concerned
with promoting and implementing mitigation efforts. In 2009, the city council of São
Paolo approved law 14.933 (São Paulo State Government 2009), which focuses on both
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and adaptation measures (Robinson 2009). In terms
of mitigation, the bill outlines a five-pronged strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2012. The mitigation plan targets five sectors for
emissions reduction: transportation, energy, waste management, construction and land
use.
For the transportation section, the bill itemizes several concrete targets. A ten
percent reduction in fossil fuel usage in public transit each year is one goal. By 2017, all
city fleets should be powered by renewable fuels. There are also stipulations to improve
traffic management by creating carpool lanes, a ride share program and improving
infrastructure for urban bicycling.
The stated goals for mitigation efforts in the energy sector are less clear-cut. The
bill encourages incentivizing renewable energy generation, but does not explicitly state
how that might be accomplished. There is also mention of incentivizing research in
energy efficiency and renewable energy. Setting higher standards for energy efficiency in
municipal lighting is one of the few specific legislative items outlined for how to reduce
emissions in the energy sector.
Mitigation efforts highlighted for the waste management sector include expanding
a citywide recycling program and cutting down on plastic bag usage. There is also a
stipulation that requires all new large building projects to include a recycling plan.
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Reducing methane at landfills, by implementing improved waste treatment programs and
methane capture, is also part of the mitigation plan in the waste management sector.
For the construction sector, the bill instructs officials to create new standards for
energy efficiency of buildings and for materials used in construction. There is also a
provision that bans the use of illegally harvested wood in municipal construction.
Efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases in the land use sector focus on maximizing
population density and increasing green space. There is a measure to increase the number
of trees in the city and to refurbish existing preservation areas.
Though not explicitly stated as a climate change mitigation or adaptation effort, in
2003, the São Paulo city council approved a strategic plan to preserve the biodiversity of
São Paulo (Green and Environment Secretariat 2005). This plan established specific
zones for environmental protection called municipal environmental protection areas. In
2007, a new municipal environmental police division was created to ensure these areas
are properly protected.
The biodiversity protection plan, managed by the Green and Environment
Secretariat, also includes a tree planting initiative. 180,000 native trees are being planted
each year to increase the green cover in the city. There is also an ordinance to create four
municipal nature parks.
Evidence of implementation of mitigation initiatives described in law 14.933 was
difficult to obtain. There is some evidence that mitigation efforts to reduce emissions are
underway. Ms. Marco Antonio, deputy mayor of São Paulo, stated that the transportation
sector has made great strides in emissions reduction (Siemens 2013). Some city buses run
on ethanol while overhead electrical lines power others. The metro has seventy
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kilometers of track which transports four million riders daily. She does admit however,
that the transportation infrastructure still needs improvement. She also failed to mention
whether the city is on track to meet the stated goal of all city fleets powered by
renewables by 2017.
According to Ms. Marco Antonio (Siemens 2013), São Paulo is still unable to
meet the water and electricity needs of its residents. As part of its mitigation efforts in the
energy sector, the city hopes to switch to renewables. However, if the city is unable to
meet current energy demand with a mix of fossil and renewable energy, it is difficult to
see how it will be able to switch to renewables entirely in the near future. Ms. Marco
Antonio also does not mention energy conservation when describing São Paulo’s
sustainable development plan. In contrast to the national plan, a discussion of income
inequality reduction is absent from the mitigation discussion. While at the national level
the sustainable development rhetoric of mitigating climate change while increasing
incomes and reducing inequality is clear, on the ground, at the municipality level, these
stated goals drop away, perhaps due to feasibility constraints (Deák 2001).
The Brazilian federal government is clearly aware of the risks climate change
currently poses and will continue to pose, and has thus passed climate change legislation
(NPCC 2008). State governments, perhaps due to the presence of the federal law, have
been less active in setting climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. It is at the
municipality level that specific mitigation and adaptation efforts are designed and
implemented (UN-Habitat 2010). While the NPCC does explicitly mention income
inequality as a social problem, it is through mitigation, not adaptation policies, that
income inequality reduction is addressed. It is also not framed as a cause of vulnerability
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to climate change, but rather a separate social concern. At the municipality level, there
appears to be even less concern for income inequality in relation to either mitigation or
adaptation to climate change.
C.

Relevance

This work is relevant to sociologists of income inequality, sociologists concerned
with vulnerability to climate change (a small but growing group), and adaptation
policymakers. Given the distinctness of these audiences, I address each separately in the
sections below.
1.

Applying the “Wilkinsonian” Theory of Income Inequality to

Middle-Income Countries
Income inequality scholars (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Gornick and Jӓntti 2013)
suggest that income inequality has negative social consequences in developed countries.
There is a great deal of debate, however, on the exact causal mechanisms for how income
inequality creates these negative impacts. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), who popularized
the claim that income inequality negatively impacts society, suggest that a breakdown of
social cohesion is one of the causal mechanisms in developed countries. Massey (1996)
proposes that income inequality produces spatial segregation which, in turn, leads to
negative social outcomes. Massey notes that, in Chicago in both the 1930s and the 1980s,
“the spatial concentration of material deprivation stemmed from the same underlying
causes: rising income inequality and growing class segregation” (Massey 1996:407).
Others (National Research Council 2003) have noted that increasing income inequality
and urbanization have led to spatial segregation of high-and low-income neighborhoods
in cities in developing countries around the world.
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In middle-income countries, the negative impacts of income inequality are often
assumed to be simply a consequence of high levels of absolute poverty. This dissertation
suggests, drawing on the work of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), absolute poverty is only
part of the story and cannot fully explain the impacts of income inequality within an
urban, middle-income society. The concentrated power of the elite, ruling class, coupled
with the spatial segregation of high- and lower-income households, in addition to high
levels of absolute poverty, leads to a situation of uneven access to assets and options that
are related to vulnerability. All are therefore contributing factors to the impacts of income
inequality in urban, middle-income countries.
While Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) make a compelling theoretical argument,
their empirical work, and specifically the quantitative methods they use to establish
causality, have been widely critiqued (Reeves 2010; Saunders 2010). This dissertation
will test the relationships between income inequality and vulnerability to climate hazards
using multi-level statistical models which are better equipped to control for spurious
relationships, and have been used extensively to test the relationship between income
inequality and health outcomes (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004).
It is also important to consider which measure of income inequality is most
appropriate. Income inequality can be calculated using various measures and geographic
levels. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) and Gornick and Jӓntti (2013) measure income
inequality at the national level, the most common geographic level of analysis. Others
(Firebaugh 2003; Milanovic 2011) have begun to popularize a focus on the study of
global income inequality.
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There are also many different methods for measuring income inequality. The Gini
index, though helpful for identifying an overall level of income inequality, fails to show
where along the income distribution the income inequality is located (Allison 1978). For
example, two countries could have the same Gini score but different income distributions.
The general entropy indexes, another class of income inequality measures, have the
added benefit of decomposition properties, where one can calculate which segment of a
population is disproportionately contributing to the inequality, e.g., women or the elderly
(Allison 1978).
The percentile ratio and income share measures of income inequality, perhaps the
easiest to understand and interpret, are often used to identify where the inequality lies
along the income distribution. Common percentile ratio measures include the 90th/50th
and the 50th/10th. These ratios compare the income level of the 90th percentile of the
income distribution to the 50th percentile, and the 50th percentile to the 10th percentile
respectively. Income share measures calculate the total share of income held by various
portions of the income distribution. For example, the income share of the bottom 20
percent is the percentage of total income held by the bottom 20 percent of the income
distribution.
By employing several different measures of income inequality, this analysis will
add to the subsection of income inequality literature focused on identifying whether the
effects of income inequality vary depending on its location along the income distribution
(Voitchovsky 2005). Testing multiple measures of income inequality also allows for a
cleaner distinction between income inequality effects and absolute poverty effects on
vulnerability. For example, for urban Brazilian municipalities, the Gini index is
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correlated with measures of absolute poverty; however, the 90th/50th percentile ratio is
not. If the Gini index is a significant predictor of vulnerability, one could argue, as critics
of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) have, that it may be simply absolute poverty at the
bottom of the distribution, and not income inequality, that is driving the relationship
between income inequality and negative social outcomes. However, if the 90th/50th
percentile ratio measure of income inequality is also a significant predictor of
vulnerability, the above critique can be challenged.
This dissertation adds to the growing body of income inequality literature in two
ways: by empirically testing whether income inequality impacts vulnerability to flooding
in Brazil; and by examining whether the effects of income inequality are different
depending on where along the income distribution the income inequality is located.
2.

Vulnerability Scholarship

Climate change will increase the frequency of natural hazards and risks for urban
populations in middle-income countries (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010). There is
agreement in the literature that not all countries, regions, municipalities and households
are equally vulnerable to natural hazards. However, there is significant debate on how
best to measure and rank vulnerability to natural hazards. In fact, Birkmann (2006:11)
notes that “the current literature encompasses more than twenty-five different definitions,
concepts and methods to systematise vulnerability.”
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) use a quantitative framework for measuring
vulnerability while Adger (1999) draws on qualitative methods to identify vulnerable
groups. In this dissertation, I add to the complex landscape of vulnerability analysis by
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utilizing Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework to test Adger’s
(1999) supposition that income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability.
3.

Climate Change Adaptation Policymakers

Although sociologists of income inequality and vulnerability to climate change
are the central audiences, climate change adaptation policy experts will also find this
research relevant to their work. Climate adaptation polices are often divided into two
types: hard and soft adaptation. Hard adaptation policies include infrastructure
improvements such as reinforcing dams or building sea walls to avoid flooding. Soft
adaptation efforts focus on planning for and increasing human adaptive capacity.
Examples include expanding insurance coverage, land-use planning and improving
emergency action warning systems (Obermaier et al. 2009).
A main component of soft adaptation policy is reducing vulnerability by
identifying which populations are most vulnerable, and structuring programs to ensure
those groups are adequately equipped to protect themselves. Attempts to manage
adaptation without consideration of vulnerability can lead to inequitable distribution of
adverse climate effects, where those least vulnerable are in a position to adapt, while the
weakest in society are left defenseless (Ribot 2011).
This research is relevant to adaptation policymakers tasked with deciding how
adaptation funds should be allocated. If there is strong empirical evidence that income
inequality is a determinant of vulnerability to climate shocks, policymakers are justified
in including income inequality measures in vulnerability assessments as well as directing
adaptation funds towards income inequality reduction schemes.
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Several vulnerability scholars (Mearns and Norton 2010) point to a correlation
between income inequality and vulnerability, but few have supplied concrete evidence of
this relationship (Adger 1999; Tompkins et al. 2008). This research hopes to substantiate
their claims by providing empirical evidence that income inequality is a predictor of
vulnerability in urban, middle-income countries.
D.

Urban Approach

This dissertation includes only those municipalities with over 20,000 residents
and at least 50 percent of households classified as urban. I select an urban approach to
join the growing body of literature focused on urban inequality and vulnerability in
middle-income countries (Bloom et al. 2008; Cohen 2004; McGranahan et al. 2007;
Romero-Lankao et al. 2012). In 2011, 84.6 percent of Brazilian households were
classified as urban (World Bank 2013). Large cities in middle-income countries continue
to grow more quickly than does the population. For example, in 2010, São Paulo’s
growth rate was 9 percent, as compared to an overall population growth rate of 1.17
percent (World City Information 2012). This urbanization trend is not unique to Brazil.
Urbanization due to migration, as well as natural increases, is continuing and rural
households will likely become an even smaller percentage of the world population in the
future. In fact, all middle-income countries are becoming more urban (Montgomery
2008; National Research Council 2003). The percentage of urban households in many
middle-income countries in 2012 was well over 50 percent (World Bank 2013).
As the world urbanizes, it is becoming increasingly important to understand social
and climate-change related dynamics within urban populations, rather than focus on rural
populations or the differences between rural and urban populations. Urban areas are often
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coastal; therefore, sea-level rise may disproportionately affect urban areas (McGranahan
et al. 2007).
E.

Generalizability

For the purposes of this analysis, Brazil is considered to be symbolic of other
large, urban, middle-income countries. I use data from a single country, rather than a
sample of many, middle-income countries, so that I can effectively, by design, control for
country-specific effects such as culture, national climate change policy or regime type. A
drawback of this approach is its inability to decipher whether the social phenomenon is
unique to Brazil or also present in other urban, middle-income countries more broadly.
One issue to consider is whether urban municipalities in Brazil are particularly
unique, compared with those in other middle-income countries, in ways that might impact
the relationships under analysis. In her longitudinal ethnographic study, Favelas: Four
Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio De Janeiro, Perlman (2011) portrays modern life
for Brazilians living in favelas (shanty towns) in Rio de Janeiro. She describes how living
conditions vary widely both within and across favelas in terms of services and
infrastructure. While many favelas have some paved roads and electricity, not all
dwellings are connected to the electricity grid. Additionally, not all favela residents are
particularly poor. Some have cars, flat-screen TVs, and all the latest electronics. Others
can barely afford school fees for their children and share single bedrooms with ten or
more family members. Perlman explains that in developing countries, the urban poor are
relegated to “the fringes of habitability, in swamps, in garbage dumps, in cemeteries, on
rocky hillsides, or in abandoned factories and office buildings” (Perlman 2011:30).
Perlman notes how favelas have grown faster than other parts of the city, a trend she
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explains is occurring in developing countries around the globe. This assertion is,
however, difficult to validate empirically as there are no reliable estimates of slum
populations (Dorelien, Balk, and Todd 2013). Perlman does point out that the violence
and safety concerns in Brazilian favelas are among the highest of any nation. However
she also suggests that the social dynamics she uncovers in Brazilian favelas are not
wholly unique to Brazil and are generalizable to other urban, middle-income countries.
Although the data cannot definitively prove as much, the literature suggests that Brazil is
a suitable case selection as urban development in Brazil is following a trajectory similar
to that of other urban, middle-income countries.
F.

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation is divided into three sections: vulnerability to climate change and
flood hazard, income inequality as a social determinant, and income inequality as a
predictor of vulnerability. In Chapter 2, I review the literatures on vulnerability to climate
change, flood hazards and vulnerability index construction. I explain how I construct the
vulnerability index I use as the dependent variable in the later analyses. I also create a
map of municipality vulnerability to more concretely illustrate the variation in levels of
vulnerability across urban, Brazilian municipalities. In Chapter 3, I discuss income
inequality as a social determinant. I review the literature on impacts of income inequality
as well as different measurements of income inequality. I explain which measures of
income inequality I use in the subsequent models and why. Lastly I map income
inequality at the municipality level to visually display the variation in income inequality
across Brazilian municipalities. Chapter 4 tackles the heart of the analysis, the
relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. In this chapter I explain in
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detail the specifics of the multi-level models I use to test the research question: is income
inequality a predictor of vulnerability to flooding? I include both the results of the
statistical analyses and a discussion of the findings. In Chapter 5, I conclude with a
summary of the main findings in previous chapters and how they add to the current
income inequality and vulnerability literatures. I highlight the climate change adaptation
policy implications of this work and suggest avenues for further inquiry. Lastly, I
conclude the work with a brief photo essay depicting five urban municipalities across
four states, each of varying levels of income inequality and vulnerability. I include this
final section in an attempt to transport the reader from the theoretic realm to the lived
experience, encouraging a more vivid, tangible understanding of how the social
phenomena described throughout this dissertation play out on the ground.
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II.

Vulnerability to Climate Change and Flood Hazards
Vulnerability to climate change, and specifically to flooding, is difficult to measure.

Drawing on the vulnerability literature for guidance, I construct a vulnerability index which aims
to capture vulnerability to flooding of urban municipalities in Brazil. In this chapter, I describe
how I construct the index using factor analysis and map the vulnerability scores of urban
municipalities. I also test for spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability, that is, the extent to which
neighboring municipalities have more similar levels of vulnerability, using spatial analysis
methods.4
As vulnerability is just one component of the overall flood risk, I also measure the flood
hazard and flood exposure levels of each municipality and include these measures, along with
the vulnerability index score, in a final flood risk map of urban Brazilian municipalities.
A.

Vulnerability and Natural Hazards: A Brief Review of the Literatures

“Over the last 100 years, the average temperature of the earth has increased over 1.4
degrees Fahrenheit. Changes in the earth’s climate are projected to continue, with an increase of
2 to 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit likely to occur in this (21st) century” (United States Environmental
Protection Agency 2014). While climate scientists agree that the earth is warming, and that
human activity is a leading cause of the temperature rise, they are unable to predict with 100
percent certainty what the exact weather implications will be. As a result of climate change, there
has been an increase in extreme weather events around the world, such as flooding, heavy
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In Chapter 4, I use this index as the dependent variable in the models which test whether
income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability to flood hazards in Brazil. Spatial
autocorrelation in the dependent variable is important to detect as it can bias results if it is not
controlled for in the final models.
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precipitation, drought and heat waves. Sea levels have also begun to rise and will continue to rise
as a result of melting ice caps and glaciers. Although it is difficult to forecast the exact weather
impacts of climate change, it is clear that an increase in flooding is of serious concern,
particularly for countries with large coastlines and river systems, such as Brazil. Urban
populations in countries with substantial coastlines, such as Brazil, are particularly at risk as they
are disproportionately located in coastal areas (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010).
In the natural hazards literature, there are myriad frameworks for how best to measure
vulnerability (Barnett, Lambert, and Fry 2008). Acknowledging the disparate state of the field,
the United Nations University Press published Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards:
Toward Disaster Resilient Societies (Birkmann 2006), an effort to showcase the different and at
times competing frameworks, and to synthesize and advance this important literature. In the final
chapter of this edited volume, Birkmann lays out a set of recommendations for researchers and
policy analysts, and focuses on the importance of incorporating and amending existing
frameworks to add value to the growing, diverse and extensive vulnerability literature landscape.
Unlike Birkmann (2006), I do not attempt to cover the complete breadth of approaches to
vulnerability analysis in the following pages. Instead I provide a brief review of a few dominant
paradigms and then focus in more detail on the vulnerability frameworks that I find to be most
relevant to the research question at hand: assessing whether income inequality is related to a
municipality’s vulnerability to flooding. In their meta-analysis, Romero-Lankao, Qin, and
Dickinson (2012) review the landscape of urban vulnerability literature, focusing on those
studies measuring urban vulnerability to temperature-related hazards. They find that the majority
of research in this area uses the urban vulnerability as impact approach, which draws on the riskhazard framework from the natural hazards literature. This approach defines vulnerability in
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terms of exposure to a specific hazard, sensitivity of the population and particular impacts, such
as mortality.
For this analysis, the urban vulnerability as impact framework is not appropriate due to
data constraints. Although impact data such as mortality and/or economic loss data are available
at the national or regional level for some countries, they are very difficult to obtain at the
municipality level, especially in middle-income countries. Some researchers (Müller, Reiter, and
Weiland 2011) have collected their own data by conducting household surveys of a single
community or municipality. Given the broad scope of my analysis (i.e., all urban municipalities
in Brazil with over 20,000 inhabitants) however, primary data collection is not feasible.
Romero-Lankao et al. (2012) identify two additional urban vulnerability frameworks:
inherent urban vulnerability and urban resilience. Inherent urban vulnerability, drawing on the
political economy literature, defines vulnerability in relation to adaptive capacity and structural
drivers. Urban resilience focuses on a population’s ability to recover from hazard stresses and
incorporates elements of the built environment in assessing hazard risk. Below in Table II-1 is a
brief summary of each framework and the data it requires.
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Table II-1. Common Urban Vulnerability Frameworks
Framework
Urban vulnerability as impact

Description
Vulnerability defined in terms of
exposure to a specific hazard,
sensitivity of the population and
particular impacts

Inherent urban vulnerability

Vulnerability defined by adaptive Socioeconomic and
capacity and structural drivers,
political economy
draws on political economy
literature

Urban resilience

Vulnerability defined as a
population’s ability to recover
from hazard stresses,
incorporates elements of the built
environment in assessing hazard
risk
Source: Romero-Lankao et al. 2012.

Data Requirements
Socioeconomic, impact,
hazard and exposure

Socioeconomic, political
economy, build
environment, hazard and
exposure

Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006:78) define vulnerability as “the characteristics of
individuals or groups in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from
the impact of a natural or anthropogenic disaster – noting that vulnerability is made up of many
political-institutional, economic and socio-cultural factors.” Their definition aligns most closely
with the inherent urban vulnerability tradition though it also incorporates elements that might
fall within the scope of the urban resilience literature, such as including building quality in their
measure of vulnerability. Consistent with the natural hazards literature, and borrowing
Crichton’s (1999) notion of the risk triangle, shown in Figure 1, Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich
(2006) define disaster risk as a function of the hazard, exposure and vulnerability.
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Figure 1. The Risk Triangle
Source: Crichton 1999.
The hazard is defined as a particular disaster type and characterized by its frequency and
severity. In the case of this dissertation, the hazard under examination is flooding. Flood hazard
is typically projected on a 100 year frequency basis, i.e., how many floods a particular region is
expected to experience within 100 years (GAR 2011). Exposure relates to the population or
property at risk, i.e., whether the property or the population are actually susceptible to harm from
the flood. For example, an overflowing river deep in the Amazon may not cause any flood risk if
there are no humans or property exposed to the flood waters. Therefore, in order for a flood risk
to exist, all three aspects of the disaster risk must be present: vulnerability, exposure and hazard
(Crichton 1999).
While the disaster risk model is widely used, some vulnerability scholars include
exposure within the definition of vulnerability itself. For example, the IPCC Third Assessment
Report defines vulnerability to climate change as:
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“the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character,
magnitude, and rate of climate variation and to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its
adaptive capacity” (IPCC 2001).
I select Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) definition of vulnerability, which describes
vulnerability as a characteristic which is both affected by, but also designated as separate from,
both the hazard and exposure levels. While I acknowledge that both hazard and exposure may
impact the level of vulnerability, I do not include measures of hazard and exposure within the
flood vulnerability index explicitly. Instead I draw on Crichton’s (1999) framework which
distinguishes between vulnerability, exposure, hazard and risk. To account for the impacts of
hazards and exposure on vulnerability, I control for these factors in the final model.
I do however, include whether or not a municipality is located within a low elevation
coastal zone (LECZ) as part of the flood vulnerability index as the location of an urban
municipality within a LECZ increases its vulnerability. The built environment may inhibit proper
drainage and increase flooding (McGranahan et al. 2007). Adaptation infrastructure is also
particularly challenging to manage in LECZs, such as the construction of high sea walls or
managing sensitive mangrove habitats to combat soil erosion (Szlafsztein and Sterr 2007).
Therefore the location of a municipality within a LECZ can be conceived of as a characteristic
which is deeply tied to coping and adaptation strategies. Clearly vulnerability and exposure are
intrinsically linked. As a researcher tasked with deciding how to differentiate the two, I rely on
the literature and follow Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) lead, taking the elevation and
coastal location of the municipality into consideration within the vulnerability index.
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Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) note how in recent years disaster management
research has become increasingly concerned with vulnerability analysis, not simply hazard
analysis, and that socioeconomic conditions, in addition to environmental conditions, play a key
role in identifying vulnerable groups. The authors point to a lacuna in the vulnerability literature
of methodology for measurement of vulnerability at the sub-national level. While vulnerability
indexes at the national or community level are common (Barnett et al. 2008), a framework which
included indicators at different “social levels” such as individual/household and community, yet
was still broad enough to allow for measurement across multiple sub-national units, was lacking.
Their contribution, a vulnerability framework and corresponding indicators which allow for
clean measurement of sub-national vulnerability, incorporating physical, environmental and
socioeconomic elements, attempts to fill the void.
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework is especially appealing as it
includes indicators at the individual, household and municipality level. This framework is also
well suited for assessing the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability in middleincome countries as it allows for a measurement of vulnerability without the need for data on a
particular impact, e.g., mortality. Another benefit of this approach is that it does not include any
measure of income inequality in the definition of vulnerability, ensuring that the hypothesis to be
tested, whether income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability, is not tautological. One
weakness of this approach is that the framework can only calculate the relative vulnerability of
municipalities, rather than an absolute level of vulnerability to a particular impact such as
mortality or economic loss.
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) sub-divide vulnerability into two categories: hazardindependent and hazard-dependent vulnerability. This distinction is helpful to the authors as they
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are aiming to create a framework they hope will be applicable to the full range of natural
disasters. Each vulnerability type includes a host of parameters at the individual, community,
country, region and cultural level5. Table II-2 and Table II-3, reproduced from Schneiderbauer
and Ehrlich’s Tables 3.2 and 3.3, list suggested indicators for measuring both hazardindependent and hazard-dependent vulnerability, respectively. In Table II-3, only the indicators
which are most relevant to flooding are included.

The cultural level is defined as a community with “shared cultural, social and/or ethnic traits”
(Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006: 95).
5
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Table II-2. Selected Hazard-independent Parameters and Potential Indicators for Vulnerability at
Different 'Social Levels'
Social levels
Individual and household

Administrative
community

Parameters
Age
Income
Health/ Disability

Indicators
Average age
GDP per capita
Malnutrition of children <5

Education
Subsistence economy in primary
sector

Life expectancy
HIV/AIDS infection rate

Savings
Individual and family related
insurance

Illiteracy rate
Productivity per capita (primary
sector)

Neighborhood network

Number of mobile phones, TVs,
radios/per capita

Access to Information
Infrastructure/accessibility
Presence and quality of civil
protection, incl. early
warning/emergency
plans/disaster management
capacities

Traffic infrastructure, Road
network
Density of rural population, Level
of urbanization, Level of
corruption

Disaster preparedness
Degree of autonomy/participation
in decision making procedures
and access to resources

Source: Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006.
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Table II-3. Selected Hazard-Dependent Parameters and Potential Indicators for Vulnerability to
Different ‘Social Levels’ for Flooding Hazard
Social levels
Individual and
household

Administrative
community

Parameters
Quality and age of building

Indicators
Main building material

Size/ Height of building

Urban growth
Number of floors
Number of families/ Residential buildings

Location of dwelling

Terrain information (for example slope gradient)

Hygiene

Altitude (relating to sea level or local
watersheds)
Access to drinking water
Quality of sewage system
Dams

Preparedness for floods

Legal regulations relating to floods
Source: Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006.
This distinction between hazard-dependent and hazard-independent indicators allows for
a more parsimonious application of the framework across disaster types. However, in practice,
many hazard-independent indicators will vary based on the hazard in question. While the authors
justify the distinction between hazard-independent and hazard-dependent parameters as helpful
for understanding certain “universal” parameters of vulnerability, this dichotomy has also been
critiqued.
Bollin and Hidajat (2006) point to the fact that the impact on vulnerability, even for
supposedly hazard-independent parameters, can still be hazard-specific. For example, age is
considered a hazard-independent parameter, yet the impact of age on vulnerability is
considerably different in a flood compared to a heat wave. Children are especially vulnerable to
floods due to their short stature and lack of swimming abilities. While heat waves are also a
concern for children, floods may be more dangerous. Considering age as a hazard-independent
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parameter obscures the different levels of vulnerability young children might experience as a
result of different hazards (Bartlett 2008). Disaster management capacity is another example.
Although listed as a hazard-independent indicator, disaster management capacity will, in fact,
vary by hazard type. If a community has a disaster management plan in place that was initially
designed to manage flood hazards, this same plan may not be as effective in the event of an
earthquake. Given these concerns, and that I am only examining one hazard as part of the
vulnerability index, flooding, I do not make the distinction between hazard-independent and
hazard-dependent vulnerability parameters in the flood vulnerability index I construct.
While Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) fail to include income inequality in their
quantitative vulnerability measure, other vulnerability scholars, following a political economy
approach, do note a relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. The political
economy approach focuses on the causes of vulnerability (Mearns and Norton 2010) and lists
income inequality as having both direct and indirect links to vulnerability. Adger (1999:264), in
his qualitative work assessing the vulnerability of coastal communities in Vietnam, explains how
income inequality can result in “concentration of wealth and capital [,] restricting access of a
larger proportion of the population from resources for buffering the impact of external shocks.”
Adger shows that income inequality impacts vulnerability in two ways – through limiting access
to resources, assets, and options, and through poverty. In Figure 2, Adger clearly defines the dual
mechanisms that link income inequality and vulnerability.
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Figure 2. Linking Inequality and Vulnerability
Source: Adger 1999.
In this research I measure vulnerability using Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006)
quantitative approach and control for both income inequality and absolute poverty in the multilevel regression model. This research design will test Adger’s (1999) and other political
economists’ supposition that income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability, not simply due
to poverty, but also due to the impacts of income inequality on social cohesion and resulting
limits to resource access. In the next chapter, I describe in more detail the relationships theorized
between income inequality, social cohesion, and resource access, drawing on the income
inequality literature.
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B.

Data

To measure vulnerability, hazard and exposure at the municipality level in Brazil, I draw
on several data sources. To capture the socioeconomic parameters in the vulnerability index, I
use household survey data from the 2010 Brazilian census, hosted in the Integrated Public Use
Micro data Series (IPUMS) International database. These data are representative at the
municipality level. To capture the health and education levels of each municipality, I use the
health and education index scores from the Indice Firjan de Desenvolvimento Municipal
(IFDM), the index of municipal development using 2010 data calculated by Sistema Firjan
(Sistema Firjan 2012), a well-regarded research and development company. The index is widely
used by the Brazilian government and other social science research institutes across Brazil.
For parameters related to municipality infrastructure and governance, I use municipality
data from the 2011 Perfil dos Municipios, a Brazilian municipality survey from the Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). To determine whether a municipality is located in a
low elevation coastal zone (LECZ), I use the LECZ spatial dataset, which defines LECZ as
coastal areas ten meters or below sea level (McGranahan et al. 2007). The LECZ is measured as
a contiguous band from the coast and extends inland until the elevation rises above ten meters.
Thus, very flat deltas which extend inland, such as parts of Amazonia, are also included as part
of the LECZ. These areas will surely be affected by sea-level rise, even though they are not
located on the coast. For this reason, they are included as part of the LECZ. To calculate the
proximity of the nearest primary road to each municipality, I use 2010 primary road data from
the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).
To measure the flood hazard, I use inland flood frequency spatial data from the 2011
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR), which projects inland flood
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frequency for a 100 year period based on previous flood occurrences, forecast precipitation
levels and climate change projections. These projections are based on observed flooding between
1999 and 2007 and do not take climate change forecasts explicitly into account. While GAR does
also provide estimates of coastal flooding, I use LECZ data instead as the GAR estimates tend to
underestimate coastal flooding6.
To identify urban areas, I use satellite data of night time lights, a spatial dataset from the
NOAA (2010). I combine urban area data with both the flood projection data and the LECZ data
to approximate urban flood exposure.
In addition to flooding, Brazil is also susceptible to a host of other natural hazards
including heat waves, epidemics, landslides, and drought (EM-DAT 2014). As this dissertation is
only focused on flood hazard, I do not include measures of these other hazards in the calculation
of disaster risk, with one exception -- landslides. Landslides can be triggered by increased
precipitation, and often occur as either a result of flooding or in tandem with flooding
(Geoscience Australia 2014). While I do not explicitly measure landslides as part of flood
hazard, landslides which result from flooding could be captured in the flood hazard
measurement. Landslides that result from other causes, such as earthquakes or increases in
precipitation that do not cause flooding, are not captured by the flood hazard measurement.

C.

Methods: Constructing the Vulnerability Index

Measuring vulnerability to natural hazards in general, and flood hazard, more
specifically, is not a cut and dry task (Barnett et al. 2008). While a variety of indexes exist at the
individual, household, community, sub-national, national, and global levels (van Ruijven et al.

6

Deborah Balk, written correspondence, January 14th, 2015.
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2014), there is little agreement in the literature on how best to capture this amorphous concept
(Barnett et al. 2008). I choose to measure municipality vulnerability by constructing a
municipality vulnerability index based on Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability
framework, which includes indicators at all levels: individual/household, administrative
community, country, region and cultural community level. As this analysis aims to capture
vulnerability at the municipality level, Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) framework, which
includes both household and sub-national parameters, is particularly useful. The index I construct
differs from Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) slightly in terms of disaggregation and scope. I
do not distinguish between hazard-independent and hazard-dependent parameters, and do not
include national or regional metrics. As this analysis focuses on differences in vulnerability
levels across municipalities within a single country, I do not include measures at these more
aggregated levels of geography.
An ideal vulnerability index would include measurable indicators of all dimensions of
vulnerability. Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) cite these as: physical, economic, social,
educational, political, institutional, cultural, environmental, and ideological. Unfortunately, data
constraints force most researchers to capture only a fraction of these dimensions. More
problematic is that there is no fully reliable way to test whether any vulnerability index is truly
capturing what it is meant to capture. One method is looking at damage or mortality reports posthazard, and measuring whether those areas most affected by a disaster had been characterized as
more vulnerable (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003). However, damage reports are typically only
available for larger geographic areas, i.e., at the country or state level. It is also difficult to
compare the magnitude of various natural hazards. For example, if an area classified as less
vulnerable had minimal flood damage, as compared to an area labeled more vulnerable, this
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could lend validity to the vulnerability index. However, this damage differential could also be
due to the fact that the hazard was more severe in the more vulnerable area (Desinventar 2014).
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich do acknowledge that data at the sub-national level can be
hard to obtain. Therefore, vulnerability measures are destined to fall short of the level of
precision desired by researchers. Due to data constraints, I am unable to include all indicators
suggested by Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich into the municipality flood vulnerability index for
Brazil. The parameters and related indicators I include are listed in the following table.
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Table II-4. Urban Municipality Flood Vulnerability Index
Parameter
Age

Indicator
% of non-working age population (<15 and >64)

Income

Log of median equivalized household income, %
below the absolute poverty line

Health

% disabled, IFDM health indicator (composite
health indicator)
IFDM education indicator (composite education
indicator)

Education
Savings

% of owner-occupied homes; % not working

Neighborhood network/access to
information
Presence and quality of civil protection
Disaster preparedness
Degree of autonomy/participation in
decision making procedures and access to
resources
Preparedness for floods
Infrastructure/accessibility

% with mobile phone, % with TVs, % with
radios
Housing/ Land-use plan
Risk plan for environmental hazards
Presence of slums, presence of tenements,
presence of informal settlements

Quality and size of building

Regulation relating to floods
Distance of municipality to primary road, % with
automobile
% of households constructed with low-quality
building material, average household size

Location of dwelling

Municipality in low elevation coastal zone

Crowding

Population density

Hygiene

% of households with piped drinking water, % of
households with sewage disposal system

1.


A Discussion of Vulnerability Parameters and Indicators

Age: Children and the elderly are more vulnerable to flood hazard as it is more
difficult for them to quickly find higher ground (Bartlett 2008). They are also smaller
in stature and therefore more susceptible to drowning. Therefore, municipalities with
lower percentages of children and elderly will be less vulnerable to flooding.
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Municipalities with a higher percentage of working-age population (15-64) are also
less economically vulnerable as they have more people available to work to recoup
economic losses.


Income: Income determines an individual’s ability to both prepare for a flood and
rebuild - the higher the income, the more capable a person is of restoring damaged
areas or protecting herself from flooding. I calculate the equivalized household
income, as opposed to per-capita household income, as equivalized income takes
economies of scale within a household into account7. I measure equivalized
household income with the median, not the mean income, as the median better
captures the typical income level when there are high levels of income inequality. I
use the log of equivalized median income to account for the fact that the relationship
between vulnerability and income is not strictly linear. As incomes increase, each
additional dollar of income has diminishing influence on household vulnerability. I
also include a measure of the percent of the population classified as “poor.” I use the
OECD definition of “poor” for Latin America (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2013), those living on less than 4 2005 USD per day at
purchasing power parity. As equivalized household income is a measure of monthly
income, I define the “poor” as those living on less than R$ 233.51 per month. While
this is a widely used measure of absolute poverty, it can also be misleading. Even an
income of twice that level will not provide a decent standard of living in the
expensive urban areas of Rio de Janeiro. In a personal interview, on December 9th

7

Households have both fixed and variable costs. Each additional household member
significantly increases only variable costs, such as food, clothing and school fees. Fixed costs,
such as rent or mortgage payments, remain unchanged.
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2014, Patrick, a tour guide at “Be a Local” favela tours, explained that a 150 square
foot room in the Rocinha favela rents for R$ 400 per month.8


Health: The physical health of individuals also contributes to their ability to both
escape and/or recover from floods. Disabled and unhealthy people are more
vulnerable than healthy individuals. In developing countries, health services are often
not as advanced. Public health knowledge is also lacking (Montgomery and Hewett
2005). This dearth of both sufficient health knowledge and services can leave people
more vulnerable. To measure health, I use two indicators, the percent of the
municipality population that is disabled, and the IFDM health indicator (Sistema Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Sistema Firjan 2012). The
IFDM is the Indice Firjan de Desenvolvimento Municipal, or the index of municipal
development calculated by Sistema Firjan, a well-regarded research and development
company. The index is widely used by the Brazilian government and other social
science research institutes across Brazil. The IFDM health measure is comprised of
three indicators: percent of women with more than six prenatal visits per live birth,
number of deaths from ill-defined causes and death rate of children under five from
preventable causes. These indicators speak to the level/quality of health knowledge
and services available in the municipality. Each component of the IFDM health index
is given equal weight and the final composite IFDM health indicator ranges from zero
to one.



Education: The level and quality of education of a population is highly indicative of
its vulnerability. A more highly educated population has the knowledge to mitigate

8

Patrick, personal interview, December 9th, 2014, Rocinha, Rio de Janerio, Brazil.
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flood damage and implement feasible solutions to rebuild wisely after the fact
(Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005). I use the IFDM measure of education, which is
comprised of six components of varying weights (Sistema Firjan 2012). The
individual components and their weights are as follows: pre-school education (20
percent), age-grade distortion, i.e., the percent of children who are older than the
average student in that grade should be (10 percent), percent of faculty with advanced
credentials (15 percent), average hours a day in class (15 percent), drop-out rate (15
percent), and average score on the IDEB (the index of basic education development,
the national exams for proficiency in language and mathematics) (25 percent). The
IFDM education index is calculated according to the above weights and scores, and as
with the metric for health, ranges from zero to one.


Savings: The wealth of the population is directly related to how capable they are of
recovering from a flood (McGranahan et al. 2007). Unfortunately, data on wealth and
savings at the municipality level are unavailable. I use two indicators to approximate
savings: percent unemployed or inactive9 and percent of owner-occupied homes.
These are the closest indicators available that help to capture wealth. The
unemployment rate is related to savings as those who are unemployed need to deplete
their savings to meet their basic needs. When unemployment rates fall, savings rates
tend to rise (Federal Statistics Office 2014). Home-ownership is a proxy for wealth as
owner-occupied housing is often a Latin American’s sole asset (De Ferranti et al.
2004). Home owners are also more likely to both protect their home and rebuild it
after a flood, given, of course, that they have the available resources.

9

I include both those unemployed and those not in the labor force for this measure.
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Neighborhood network/Access to information: The ability to access pertinent hazard
information keenly influences vulnerability. Flood warnings are often broadcast over
mass-media channels. To capture information access, I use three separate indicators:
the percent of households with mobile phones, the percent of households with TVs,
and the percent of households with radios.



Governance measures: The institutional infrastructure of a municipality also greatly
influences its level of vulnerability. Well-prepared municipalities with strong
governance structures will have a greater capacity to prepare for, and recover from
flooding (Puppim de Oliveira 2009). Assessing the quality and efficacy of institutions
is difficult and only indirect measures are available. The indicators I select record
whether particular policies are in place. They cannot, unfortunately, lend insight into
the quality of the policy design or the level of implementation.
o Presence and quality of civil protection: The selected indicator, presence of a
housing/land use plan, relates to flooding as municipalities with a land use
plan will mark flood prone areas as unavailable for development. Land use
plans also are designed to minimize soil erosion, another factor which can
exacerbate flooding (McGranahan et al. 2007).
o Disaster preparedness: The presence of a risk plan for environmental hazards
is a good indicator of whether a municipality has policies in place to manage
hazards. As flooding is the most common natural hazard in Brazil (EM-DAT
2014), it is likely that the risk plan is designed to take flooding into account,
except possibly in the most arid regions.
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o Degree of autonomy/participation in decision making procedures and access
to resources: Although there is no direct measure of this parameter, I use the
presence of slums, tenements and informal housing to indicate the degree of
participation and access to resources. This indicator selection is based on
literature (National Research Council 2003) which notes how informal
settlements and slums are often treated as silos and have little access to
government support and resources. While slums are also often an indicator of
poverty, their existence speaks to the level of support government institutions
are providing. The existence of illegal settlements suggests that the
government is not evenly distributing municipal resources to all residents.
Slum dwellers are mostly excluded from municipal supports (McGranahan et
al. 2013).
o Preparedness for floods: Whether or not a municipality has dedicated policies
to address flooding is an important measure of vulnerability. Those
municipalities that have taken concrete steps towards reducing flood risk, such
as building sea walls, are likely to be less vulnerable to flooding in the future.


Infrastructure/accessibility: The ability to flee a flood zone quickly as well as receive
supplies post-flood are contributing factors to the vulnerability of a municipality.
Areas far from major highways may become isolated from humanitarian aid. Public
transport may be limited. I use distance to primary road and percent of households
with their own automobile to capture this parameter. I considered including a
measure of public transport, however, this indicator would also be imperfect. Even
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high quality public transport systems may be affected by flooding, as with the New
York City subway system during Hurricane Sandy.


Quality and size of building: The quality of the walls of a home will determine how
susceptible the dwelling is to flood damage. To measure building quality, I create a
binary variable of whether the primary material used to construct the walls is
“substantial”. I code homes without walls, walls made from reused materials, wood,
plant-based materials and coated clay/mud with sticks as “not-substantial,” and walls
made from brick with plaster, brick without plaster, and unfinished lather and plaster
as “substantial.” Those homes made from walls of “other material” (0.3 percent of the
sample), I code as missing data. Although this coding system is admittedly basic, it is
a proxy for building quality and will distinguish between homes that are more or less
vulnerable to flood damage. I also include a measure of average household size as
larger households have more people at risk.



Location of dwelling: A municipality’s elevation and proximity to the coast
determine how vulnerable a municipality is to coastal flooding. Those municipalities
in low elevation coastal zones, defined as zones with an elevation of 10 meters or
below sea level, are more vulnerable to coastal flooding. I identify municipalities in
LECZ (low elevation coastal zone) using the LECZ spatial data set (McGranahan et
al. 2007). I code a municipality as a LECZ if any part of the municipality falls within
the LECZ.



Crowding: I include a measure of population density, as more densely populated
urban municipalities will likely incur more damage in the event of flooding. There is
some evidence that population density may also reduce vulnerability. In higher
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income countries, high density areas are often highly developed urban area with
advanced risk plans. In developing countries, scholars have argued that it is easier to
target aid in densely populated areas (Martine and Schensul 2013). However, in
Brazil, more densely populated areas include overcrowded areas, where evacuation
can be more difficult (Perlman 2011). For this reason I include population density as
an indicator which increases vulnerability.


Hygiene: Both the condition of water and sanitation infrastructure are important
measures of vulnerability. Residents of municipalities without piped water and
sewage disposal systems are more at risk for dehydration and water-borne illness in
the case of floods (Bartlett 2008). I measure municipality hygiene using two
indicators: the percent of households with piped drinking water, and the percent of
households with a sewage disposal system.
2.

Relating Vulnerability Indicators and Income Inequality

While some components of vulnerability are due to demographic variation, such as age,
others are theorized to be the consequences of income inequality. As mentioned in the previous
section, income inequality may affect vulnerability both directly through absolute poverty and
indirectly through uneven resource access. Almost all parameters in the index, except for age,
measure either direct or indirect resource access. Parameters such as income, percent
unemployed, quality of building material and owner-occupied home may be influenced by elites
governing in their best interest, keeping wage increases and skilled job growth as low priorities,
thus prolonging poverty and inhibiting social mobility (Portes 2010). Access to high-quality
health care, water, sanitation, education, information and infrastructure may also be controlled by
elite groups, and therefore may be affected by income inequality (Weinstein 1982).
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Similarly, governance measures are related to income inequality such that elites may not
find it worthwhile to divert municipality funds towards public safety measures, given that they
are capable of protecting their own properties using their own private funds. This phenomenon of
high-income households “opting-out” of paying for public services is well-documented in the
income inequality literature (Frank 2007). The presence of slums, tenements and informal
housing speak to the spatial segregation and breakdown in social cohesion which are theorized to
be consequences of income inequity. This leaves lower income families to settle far from the
high-income families and decisions makers, often in areas prone to flooding. Although certain
favelas in Rio de Janeiro are in the city center, many informal settlements in Brazil are located in
city outskirts, in flood prone areas, with limited access to resources, and off the radar of public
officials who ultimately decide how municipality resources are allocated (Baptista and Adamo
2014). While some elites do also choose to settle in areas with a high risk of flooding, or high
elevation coastal areas with steep slopes, which are prone to landslides, elites are also in a
financial position to construct their properties using state-of-the-art, disaster resistant
construction materials and designs (McGranahan et al. 2007). In the unfortunate event that their
homes are destroyed, they are able to rebuild. Elites may also be more capable than favela
residents of directing government resources toward protecting their properties, even when they
are built in environmentally sensitive locations (Adger 1999; Puppim de Oliveira 2009).
3.

Building the Index using Factor Analysis

To create the vulnerability index, first I normalize each indicator following the United
Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) method and scale each indicator to a value of 0 to
1.
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Normalized value =
actual value − minimum value
maximum value − minimum value
While there are several methods for normalizing values for indexes (Nicoletti, Scarpetta,
and Boylaud 1999), I follow the UN HDI method as it is commonly used in the vulnerability
literature (Romero-Lankao, Qin, and Borbor-Cordova 2013). As some indicators in the analysis
are binary, I use a polychoric correlation matrix, rather than the standard factor analysis matrix
based on Pearson’s correlations, which assumes all indicators are continuous.
I follow Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley’s (2003) method of using factor analysis to generate
synthetic components and use an additive model to create a vulnerability index score for each
municipality. I follow the Kaiser criterion and only keep factors with eigenvalues of 1 or above.
Although there are several “stopping rule” options for deciding which factors to keep when using
factor analysis, the Kaiser criterion is a commonly used method. The justification for this
approach is that each factor should explain more variance that any single indicator (Nardo et al.
2005).
Next I rotate the factors using the “varimax rotation” to maximize ease of interpretation
of each factor. The aim of the rotation is to minimize the number of indicators that have high
loading (i.e., high correlation) with the factor. This aids in interpreting the factor as each factor
can be categorized as representative of an underlying process or concept which encapsulates the
indicators with the highest loadings. Table II-5 below lists descriptive statistics for each
normalized indicator. Table II-6 lists the associated, rotated factor score. Table II-7 groups the
indicators based on their factor correlations. Three concepts emerge from the factor analysis as
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the main drivers of vulnerability to flooding: socioeconomic status (Factor 1), infrastructure
(Factor 2) and poor governance (Factor 3)
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Table II-5. Descriptive Statistics of Vulnerability Index Indicators
Normalized Indicator

Mean SD

% of non-working age population

0.36

0.14

Log of median equivalized household income

0.56

0.16

% below the absolute poverty line

0.23

0.19

% disabled

0.41

0.17

IFDM health indicator (composite health indicator)

0.63

0.20

IFDM education indicator(composite education indicator)

0.57

0.21

% of owner-occupied homes

0.48

0.15

% unemployed or inactive

0.47

0.16

% with mobile phone

0.81

0.16

% with TV

0.88

0.13

% with radio

0.78

0.14

Housing/land-use plan

0.42

0.49

Environmental risk management plan

0.15

0.36

Presence of slums

0.35

0.48

Presence of tenements

0.25

0.43

Presence of informal settlements

0.76

0.43

Specific actions taken to reduce flood risk

0.57

0.50

Minimum distance to main road

0.04

0.13

% with automobile

0.44

0.25

% of households constructed with low quality building material 0.11

0.18

Average # of people per household

0.20

0.12

Municipality in low elevation coastal zone (LECZ)

0.18

0.38

Population density(pop/area)

0.01

0.04

% of households with piped drinking water

0.87

0.19

% of households with sewage system

0.60

0.29

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011;
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007.
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Table II-6. Factor Correlations
Normalized Indicator

Socioeconomic
Status
Correlation
-0.88

Infrastructure
Correlation
-0.20

Poor
Governance
Correlation
-0.11

Log of median equivalized household
income
% below the absolute poverty line

0.97

-0.08

0.10

-0.95

-0.01

-0.08

% Disabled

-0.51

0.42

0.01

IFDM health indicator (composite health
indicator)
IFDM education indicator(composite
education indicator)
% of owner-occupied homes

0.78

0.20

-0.03

0.78

0.14

-0.12

-0.45

-0.19

0.19

% unemployed or inactive

-0.90

0.16

0.00

% with mobile phone

0.79

0.16

0.18

% with TV

0.67

0.49

0.14

% with radio

0.71

0.32

0.01

Housing/land-use plan

0.24

-0.08

0.14

Environmental risk management plan

0.16

0.09

0.58

Presence of slums

0.01

-0.05

0.64

Presence of tenements

0.08

0.09

0.43

Presence of informal settlements

0.17

-0.11

0.41

Specific actions taken to reduce flood risk

0.27

0.11

0.52

Minimum distance to main road

-0.21

-0.69

-0.04

% with automobile

0.95

-0.03

-0.04

% of households constructed with low
quality building material
Average # of people per household

-0.13

-0.76

0.02

-0.77

-0.38

0.09

Municipality in low elevation coastal zone

-0.16

0.05

0.48

Population density(pop/area)

0.06

-0.01

0.55

% of hholds with piped drinking water

0.79

0.24

0.06

% of hholds with sewage system

0.67

0.29

0.11

Eigenvalue (Variance)

9.55

2.10

2.08

Cumulative Variance Explained

0.61

0.74

0.88

% of non-working age population

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011;
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007.
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Table II-7. Indicators by Factor: Ordered by Factor Correlation Score
Factor 1:
Socioeconomic
status
Log of median
equivalized hh
income
% below absolute
poverty line
% with
automobile
% unemployed or
inactive
% of non-working
age population
% with mobile
phone
% of hh with piped
water
IFDM education
indicator
IFDM health
indicator
Average # of
people per hh
% of hh with radio
% of hh with TV
% of hh with
sewage system
Housing/land-use
plan
% of owneroccupied homes
% Disabled

Factor 2:
Infrastructure
0.97 % of hh constructed
with low quality
building material
-0.95 Minimum distance
to main road
0.95
-0.90
-0.88
0.79
0.79

Factor 3: Poor
Governance
-0.76 Presence of slums

0.64

-0.69 Environmental risk
plan
Population density

0.58

Actions taken to
reduce flood risk
Municipality in
LECZ
Presence of
tenements
Presence of
informal
settlements

0.55
0.52
0.48
0.43
0.41

0.78
0.78
-0.77
0.71
0.67
0.67
0.24
-0.45
-0.51

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011;
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007.
Factor 1: Socioeconomic Status
The first factor, which I label socioeconomic status, explains 61 percent of the variance
across municipalities. Indicators that highly, positively correlate with Factor 1 include median
income, percent of households with automobile, and percent of households with mobile phones
and piped drinking water. Percent in absolute poverty and percent not working highly, negatively
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correlate to Factor 1. Education and health scores highly, positively correlate with Factor 1, also
markers of socioeconomic status. Given the correlation values, Factor 1 is considered a measure
of socioeconomic status, where a higher Factor 1 score indicates lower vulnerability.
Factor 2: Infrastructure
The second factor, which I term infrastructure, explains 13 percent of the variance across
municipalities. Indicators highly, negatively correlated with Factor 2 include the percentage of
households constructed from poor quality building material and the minimum distance to a main
road (the higher the value, the further the distance from a main road). Factor 2, like Factor 1 is
thus classified as a measure which indicates lower vulnerability.
Factor 3: Poor Governance
The third and final retained factor, which explains 13 percent of the variance across
municipalities, I describe as a measure of poor governance. Indicators which positively and
highly correlate with Factor 3 include the presence of slums, tenements, informal settlements,
location within a LECZ and population density. The presence of an environmental risk plan and
specific measures enacted to reduce flood risk also correlate positively with Factor 3, but to a
lesser degree than the “slums” indicator. This could be because many of the densely populated,
low elevation areas along the coast are also among the largest, most developed municipalities
and therefore have more advanced policies. As the majority (though not all) of the indicators
which correlate positively and highly with Factor 3 increase vulnerability, Factor 3 is considered
a measure which indicates higher vulnerability.
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4.

Weighting and Combining Factors to Create the Final Index Score

Each factor generated by the factor analysis explains a different proportion of the total
variance across municipalities. Combined, the three factors explain 88 percent of the variance
across municipalities. I use an equal weighting method to aggregate the factors. Although there
are many possible options for weighing factors, equal weighting is preferred in the absence of
strong theoretical support for weighting one factor over another (Cutter et al. 2003). Another
weighting method, used by Nicoletti et al. (1999), is to weight factors based on the cumulative
variance explained by each factor. This method however prioritizes variation in indicators across
municipalities over actual contribution of the given indicator toward the overall vulnerability of
the municipality. For example, the factor highly correlated with income may explain more
variance between municipalities than the factor highly correlated with presence of slums, but
socioeconomic status may not necessarily be more indicative of vulnerability than presence of
slums. For this reason, I follow Cutter et. al. (2003) approach and given equal weight to each
factor when aggregating to create the final index. I aggregate the three factors as follows:
Factor 3 - Factor 2 - Factor 1= Vulnerability Index Score
I subtract Factors 1 and 2 from Factor 3 as Factors 1 and 2 indicate lower vulnerability
while Factor 3 indicates higher vulnerability. The final vulnerability index score is, therefore, a
measure of vulnerability such that a higher score indicates a higher level of vulnerability. I also
conduct my analysis on each factor separately to gain a better understanding of which
components of vulnerability, if any, are tied to income inequality.
Factor analysis, commonly used as an exploratory research tool to reduce a lengthy list of
collinear variables into a more manageable size, has become an increasing common technique
for constructing indexes of socioeconomic status and wellbeing (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006).
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Critics suggest that the method is arbitrary as it relies too heavily on subjective conclusions by
the researcher. It is, after all, up to the researcher to assign a specific “concept” to each factor,
rather than simply construct the index by aggregating each specific indicator. However, any
index construction technique requires a measure of subjectivity. Decisions about which
indicators to include and how each should be weighted are never cut and dry. Researchers
constructing indexes using factor analysis, much like those using more straightforward
aggregation techniques, need to be guided by theory and the literature to ensure their indexes
truly reflect the social conditions they aim to capture. By constructing the index using
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework and parameters, I am closely
following the prescriptions of the vulnerability literature. Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) also
recommend using factor analysis to aggregate the indicators in their vulnerability framework.
While factor analysis has its critics, it is also acknowledged as a useful way to identify
which indicators are most valuable (Cutter et al. 2003; Nardo et al. 2005; Schneiderbauer and
Ehrlich 2006).When building an index which attempts to capture a complex social situation, such
as vulnerability, it is certain that indicators will be correlated with each other. Factor analysis is
recognized as one method of ensuring that all factors used in the index are adding new
information and explanatory power.
Another common method for aggregating sub-indicators and determining weights is the
multiple linear regression model. This method however assumes independence across the subindicators. When sub-indicators are correlated, as with those used in this analysis, the multiple
linear regression model technique is inappropriate.
To test the sensitivity of the vulnerability index to alternative aggregation and weighting
methods, I re-construct the index using an alternative method, an additive approach. The results
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of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the selection of aggregation method does not significantly
alter results. The vulnerability scores under the alternative aggregation method were highly
correlated with those obtained using the factor analysis method. A summary of the sensitivity
analysis and results are described in Appendix A. Sensitivity Analysis
This dissertation aims to test whether income inequality, apart from its relationship to
absolute poverty, is a determinant of municipality vulnerability. This is challenging to test
empirically as vulnerability, absolute poverty and certain measures of income inequality are all
correlated. It is possible, however, to be poor and less vulnerable than others who are equally
poor, depending on social structural components. This is the argument Klinenberg (2002) makes
in Heat Wave, where he shows how lower income residents in a tight-knit community fared
much better during the Chicago heat wave than equally low-income residents living in a
community with weaker social ties. Capturing this phenomenon using the vulnerability index
above surely has its difficulties. One may make the argument that many indicators in the index
are often correlated with poverty and therefore it is not possible to cleanly distinguish between
the effects of income inequality and poverty on vulnerability. For this reason, when I run
regression models to test whether income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability, I control for
the percentage of the population within each municipality that falls below the absolute poverty
line. I also test income inequality as a predictor using several different measures of income
inequality which are not correlated with absolute poverty. This approach allows for the model to
parse out the effects of absolute poverty vs. income inequality on vulnerability.
Admittedly, this is not a perfect solution. One could argue that absolute poverty is an
endogenous variable, such that at higher levels of vulnerability to flooding, absolute poverty
increases. While this may be true in some areas, it does not have to be the case. Many areas that
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are vulnerable to future flooding as a result of increasing climate change have not yet weathered
a flood. As such, although one can imagine scenarios where the flood vulnerability level has
influenced the absolute poverty level, this is not necessarily the case for each municipality under
analysis.
When modelling complex social phenomena with social scientific quantitative models, it
is often challenging to define unequivocally every independent variable in the model as strictly
exogenous. The best one can do is to test several different model specifications, acknowledge the
model limitations and draw on social theory to support the empirical findings.

D.

Mapping vulnerability

In the above factor analysis, I calculate municipality vulnerability based on certain
municipality characteristics, but do not explicitly consider the spatial component of vulnerability
to flooding. Tobler's First Law of Geography states that "everything is related to everything else,
but near things are more related than distant things" (Tobler 1970). Flood hazard (frequency and
severity of flooding) is not randomly distributed in space, and thus, according to Tobler’s law,
can create a situation where vulnerable municipalities may be clustered together in space. For
example, if there is a flood in a particular region, neighboring municipalities may be jointly
exposed, and therefore have fewer available resources in neighboring areas to draw upon. This
was the case in the Chicago heat wave (Klinenberg 2002). Spatial dependence can also arise due
to regional geographies. For example, some areas of the country are more developed and
prosperous than others. The Northern part of the country lies within the Amazon rainforest while
the arid Northeast has historically had lower levels of economic development than the more
affluent Southeast. Lastly, the political economy of a state may be responsible for spatial
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dependence. Municipalities within the same state are subject to the same political environment
which may be influencing their vulnerability levels in similar ways.
Map 1 identifies Brazilian coastlines and national boundaries to place the 1276 urban
municipalities under analysis within the larger geography of South America. Map 2 shows urban
areas within urban municipalities, as identified by night time lights data (NOAA 2010). Urban
municipalities are those with over 20,000 residents and at least 50 percent of households
categorized as urban. While some rural municipalities do have urban areas, only urban areas
within urban municipalities are displayed in Map 210.

10

In Appendix B. Identifying Urban Areas within Urban Municipalities, I examine an alternative
method of identifying urban areas within municipalities using Brazilian census tracts designated
as urban, as opposed to night time lights data. I compare a map of night time lights urban extents
with an urban census tract map and describe why I selected night time lights data to define urban
areas, rather than census tract data.
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Map 1. South America
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Map 2. Urban Areas of Brazil
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1.

Analysis of Spatial Dependence of Vulnerability

To identify whether there is, in fact, spatial dependence, I map municipality vulnerability
scores using ArcGIS software. Map 3 displays the distribution of vulnerability scores across
municipalities. It is clear that there is a spatial pattern to vulnerability scores. Municipalities in
the Northern areas appear significantly more vulnerable, compared to those in the Southeast.
It is important to note that there is a significant differential between municipality land
area and municipality population size in Brazil. Although the large (in terms of land area)
municipalities in the North are highly vulnerable, they are also less populated than those in the
Southeast. To capture the distribution of vulnerable populations across Brazilian municipalities, I
map vulnerability score by population size in Map 4. In subsequent maps, in an effort to reduce
clutter, I do not include population counts. I ask the reader to keep this population differential in
mind, however, when examining future maps.
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Map 3. Flood Vulnerability in Urban Municipalities of Brazil
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Map 4. Flood Vulnerability by Population Size in Urban Municipalities
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Next I map each component of vulnerability separately in Map 5, Map 6 and Map 7.
Socioeconomic status displays strong spatial dependence. The infrastructure and governance
components of vulnerability appear to be more randomly distributed in space.
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Map 5. Socioeconomic Status
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Map 6. Infrastructure Quality
72

Map 7. Governance Score
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To test whether the observed spatial dependencies in the overall vulnerability score and
its components are statistically significant, I calculate a commonly used measure of spatial
autocorrelation (the degree to which neighboring vulnerability scores are similar or dissimilar),
the Global Moran’s I. I use inverse distance for the calculations, which means that neighboring
municipalities have a greater influence on a given municipality score than municipalities that are
farther away (Lloyd 2010). The Global Moran’s I score for the vulnerability index is 0.51 with a
p-value of 0.00. This indicates significant, positive spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability scores.
I also calculate the Global Moran’s I score for each component of vulnerability. The results are
listed on each map and summarized in the Table II-8 below. While all components of
vulnerability have some degree of spatial dependence, the socioeconomic status factor has the
most while the governance factor has the least.
Table II-8. Spatial Autocorrelation of Vulnerability and Its Three Components
Measure
Global Moran's I P-Value
Flood Vulnerability Index
0.51
0.00
Socioeconomic Status
0.77
0.00
Infrastructure
0.30
0.00
Poor Governance
0.24
0.00
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011;
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007.
In Map 8 I display another measure of spatial autocorrelation, the Anselin Local Moran’s
I values. This spatial statistic is a type of cluster analysis and identifies whether neighboring
municipalities have similarly high (high-high) or similarly low (low-low) vulnerability scores
(Lloyd 2010). It also displays outliers, those municipalities which are different from their
neighbors, i.e., a municipality with a low score surrounded by high scores (low-high) and
municipalities with high scores surrounded by low scoring municipalities (high-low). It is clear
that there is significant clustering of municipality vulnerability scores. The municipalities in the
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North and Northeast regions have high vulnerability scores while those in the Southeast have
lower scores. There are some outliers however. In the Southeast, for example, some
municipalities are high-low, i.e., those with higher scores are surrounded by those with lower
scores. The Northeast has some low-high areas, municipalities with lower scores surrounded by
those with higher scores.
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Map 8. Vulnerability Cluster Analysis: Local Moran's I
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2.

Analysis of Flood Risk: Vulnerability, Hazard and Exposure

It is important to recall that in this dissertation I define vulnerability apart from hazard
and exposure, following the risk triangle framework (Crichton 1999). In Map 9 I display flood
hazards across all municipalities. Flood hazard is captured in two ways: the number of likely
floods a municipality is projected to experience in the next 100 years, and whether a municipality
is located within a low elevation coastal zone (LECZ). LECZs are considered flood hazards as
these zones are at risk of flooding from sea-level rise and storm surges as a result of climate
change (McGranahan et al. 2007). In Brazil, however, LECZs are not strictly coastal zones.
These areas also include low elevation inland delta areas that will be impacted by sea-level rise
and storm surges.11 The flood frequency projections are calculated by the Global Assessment
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR 2011).

11

The location of the municipality in a low elevation coastal zone is also an element in the
vulnerability index. In the context of climate change, LECZ is both a marker of vulnerability and
flood exposure as sea levels are predicted to rise in the coming years due to increasing
greenhouse gas emissions.
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Map 9. Flood Hazards in Brazil
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I combine flood hazard, flood exposure and flood vulnerability in Map 10 to display
those municipalities with high, overall flood risk. I define high flood risk municipalities as those
municipalities with a high or very high vulnerability index score, a significant flood hazard and
urban areas exposed to flood hazards. Urban areas are identified using night time lights data,
which were captured using satellites.
Flood exposure is represented by whether the urban areas within a municipality are
exposed to flood hazards. Urban municipalities with urban areas located either within an LECZ
or which are projected to flood more than twice in 100 years are considered to have high flood
exposure. In Appendix C. Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods, I describe
how I identify urban areas with flood exposure using spatial data conditioning methods in
ArcGIS (Lloyd 2010). 207 urban municipalities are exposed to coastal flooding, i.e., have urban
areas located within a LECZ. 670 urban municipalities are exposed to moderate inland flooding,
i.e., have urban areas projected to flood at least twice in 100 years, and 129 urban municipalities
are exposed to severe inland flooding, i.e. have urban areas projected to flood 4 or more times in
100 years.
Urban municipalities with larger populations also have higher exposure, compared to those
with smaller populations. Although population is not captured in Map 10, it is listed in the
accompanying table. The exposed population figures listed in the table are the total number of
people in urban households within each municipality. These population counts are calculated
from 2010 census tract data. Over 41.3 million urban residents, approximately 26 percent of the
urban population and 22 percent of the total population of Brazil, are located in municipalities
with high flood risk.
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Map 10. Urban Municipalities with High Flood Risk
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In Appendix D. Close up Maps of Flood Risks, maps for high flood risk municipalities in
the Northeast and Southeast of Brazil are displayed. Table II-9 corresponds to Map 10 and lists
those urban municipalities designated as high flood risk. These 83 municipalities have a
vulnerability index score at least one standard deviation above the mean and have urban areas
located within an LECZ and/or urban areas which are projected to flood more than twice in 100
years. Municipalities numbered 1 through 69 are those with urban areas located within a LECZ
but not projected to have more than two floods in the next 100 years. Municipalities numbered
70 through 83 are those with urban areas projected to flood more than twice in 100 years. The
first six municipalities listed in the table are those with urban areas exposed to both types of
flood hazards, i.e., urban areas located within an LECZ and urban areas projected to flood more
than twice in the next 100 years. The subsequent high risk municipalities are listed in descending
order by urban population count.
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Table II-9. High Flood Risk Urban Municipalities

Vulnerability
index score

Urban
population

# of total
projected
floods in
urban
areas

0.66

1409351

41

3

0.69
0.71
1.17

130469
44657
37904

17
13
4

1
1
1

0.78
1.25

25276
19965

17
4

1
1

São Paulo

0.8

11152344

19

0

Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro

0.96

6320446

2

1

16

Salvador

Bahia

0.95

2674923

0

1

17

Fortaleza

Ceará

0.69

2452185

2

1

29

Recife

Pernambuco

0.65

1537704

2

1

47

Belém

Pará

0.99

1381475

0

1

61

São Gonçalo

Rio de Janeiro

0.75

998999

0

1

20

São Luís

Maranhão

0.78

958522

0

1

1

Maceió

0.97

932129

2

1

34

Natal

Alagoas
Rio Grande do
Norte

0.8

803739

2

1

58

Nova Iguaτu

Rio de Janeiro

0.75

787563

2

1

26

Jaboatão dos Guararapes

Pernambuco

0.88

630595

0

1

36

Aracaju

Sergipe

0.78

571149

0

1

46

Ananindeua

Pará

0.68

470819

0

1

62

São João de Meriti

Rio de Janeiro

0.94

458673

0

1

64

Santos

São Paulo

0.79

419086

0

1

56

Campos dos Goytacazes

Rio de Janeiro

0.67

418725

2

1

53

Serra

Espírito Santo

0.8

406450

2

1

68

Florianópolis

Santa Catarina

0.65

405286

0

1

39

Macap

Amapá

0.97

381214

2

3

27

Olinda

Pernambuco

0.86

370332

0

1

54

Vitória

Espírito Santo

0.79

327801

2

1

28

Paulista

Pernambuco

0.93

300466

0

1

63

Guarujá

São Paulo

0.83

290696

0

1

65

Novo Hamburgo

Rio Grande do Sul

0.65

234798

2

1

Map
number

Municipality

81

Porto Alegre

82
70
77

Sapucaia do Sul
Camocim
Laranjal do Jari

80
78

Portão
Almeirim

Rio Grande do
Sul
Rio Grande do
Sul
Ceará
Amapá
Rio Grande do
Sul
Pará

79

São Paulo

60

State

# of urban
areas in
LECZ

82

6

Camaçari

Bahia

1.06

231973

2

1

51

Santarém

Pará

0.79

215790

2

1

66

São Leopoldo

Rio Grande do Sul

0.68

213238

2

1

57

Macaé

0.83

202859

2

1

35

Parnamirim

Rio de Janeiro
Rio Grande do
Norte

0.85

202456

0

1

69

Itaja

Santa Catarina

0.82

173452

2

1

23

Cabo de Santo Agostinho

Pernambuco

0.95

167783

0

1

11

Lauro de Freitas

Bahia

0.67

163449

0

1

9

Ilhéus

Bahia

0.83

155281

2

1

55

Cabo Frio

Rio de Janeiro

0.67

140486

2

1

71

Timon

Maranhão

0.66

135133

26

0

83

Uruguaiana

Rio Grande do Sul

0.67

117415

29

0

15

Porto Seguro

Bahia

0.76

104078

2

1

40

Santana

Amapá

1.01

99111

2

1

21

Bayeux

Paraíba

0.71

98793

2

1

24

Igarassu

Pernambuco

1.01

93931

0

1

22

Abreu e Lima

Pernambuco

0.79

86625

0

1

44

Abaetetuba

Pará

1.19

82998

0

1

18

Paço do Lumiar

Maranhão

0.74

78811

0

1

8

Candeias

Bahia

0.75

75994

0

1

48

Bragança

Pará

0.88

72621

2

1

67

Sapiranga

Rio Grande do Sul

0.76

72286

2

1

42

Parintins

Amazonas

1.26

69890

2

1

38

São Cristóvão

Sergipe

0.82

66665

2

1

25

Ipojuca

Pernambuco

0.78

59719

2

1

41

Itacoatiara

Amazonas

1.3

58157

2

1

74

Cruzeiro do Sul

Acre

1.39

55326

4

0

5

São Miguel dos Campos

Alagoas

0.68

52566

0

1

3

Marechal Deodoro

0.79

43392

2

1

33

Macaíba

Alagoas
Rio Grande do
Norte

0.67

42631

0

1

49

Oriximin

Pará

0.98

40147

2

1

14

Nova Viçosa

Bahia

0.77

33526

2

1

50

Salinópolis

Pará

0.8

33391

0

1

12

Mata de São João

Bahia

0.8

29825

2

1

45

Alenquer

Pará

1.02

27722

0

1

59

Parati

Rio de Janeiro

0.79

27689

0

1

13

Mucuri

Bahia

0.77

27492

2

1

7

Canavieiras

Bahia

0.75

25903

2

1

83

43

Óbidos

Pará

1.29

25466

2

1

76

Sena Madureira

Acre

1.62

25112

4

0

19

São Bento

Maranhão

0.68

23508

0

1

31

Sirinhaém

Pernambuco

0.93

21484

2

1

37

Laranjeiras

Sergipe

0.74

21257

2

1

4

São Luís do Quitunde

0.71

20588

0

1

32

Canguaretama

Alagoas
Rio Grande do
Norte

0.67

20235

2

1

52

Itapemirim

Espírito Santo

0.78

19330

2

1

10

Ituberá

Bahia

0.91

19252

0

1

2

Maragogi

Alagoas

1.26

18625

0

1

75

Feijó

Acre

0.91

16636

4

0

72

São José do Belmonte

Pernambuco

0.76

16168

19

0

30

Rio Formoso

Pernambuco

1.07

13373

2

1

73

Luzilândia

Piauí

0.66

13268

26

0

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011;
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 2011.
This spatial presentation of flood risk maps measures of vulnerability, flood hazard, and
flood exposure as separate entities. Flood hazard and flood exposure may also be impacting the
level of vulnerability in a given municipality. In the subsequent chapters, when analyzing income
inequality as a predictor of vulnerability, I control for both the flood hazard and flood exposure
in the models, acknowledging that while vulnerability is measured as its own entity, apart from
hazard and exposure, both of these elements may also be impacting the level of vulnerability of a
municipality.
In this chapter, I briefly reviewed the vulnerability literature and how income inequality
is addressed by vulnerability scholars. I draw on an established vulnerability index framework
and construct a vulnerability index for urban Brazilian municipalities. Next I map vulnerability
scores and detect the presence of strong spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability. Lastly, I map
those municipalities with high vulnerability, high flood hazard and high flood exposure, to
demonstrate the magnitude of the population at potential risk of flooding. In the next chapters, I
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delve more concretely into the income inequality literature and continue to assemble further
evidence for the hypothesized relationship between income inequality and vulnerability.
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III. Income Inequality as a Social Determinant
A.

Literature Review

The income inequality literature is broad and encompasses a plethora of topics ranging
from the extent to which different nations and political systems create income inequality (Förster
and Vleminckx 2004), to the impacts of women’s employment on the inequality of incomes
within households (Harkness 2013), to how the inclusion of unpaid work can impact levels of
income inequality across households (Folbre et al. 2013). While there are some outliers, the bulk
of income inequality research can be divided into three board topics: the causes of income
inequality, the impacts of income inequality, and different methods of measuring income and
income inequality. This dissertation is most concerned with the latter two, and more specifically,
with their intersection.
The first task is to examine whether or not income inequality within urban municipalities
in Brazil impacts municipality vulnerability to climate change, with a focus on flooding in
particular. The second is to select the appropriate measures of income inequality. The third is to
determine whether the location of the income inequality along the income distribution impacts
the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. As this dissertation’s concern with
income inequality is three-fold, I divide the literature review into three sections. First, I present a
discussion of works focused on the impacts of income inequality more broadly. Next, I briefly
address measures of income inequality. Lastly, I discuss previous works focused on whether the
location of the income inequality along the distribution “matters” in terms of its impacts on
social cohesion, economic growth and vulnerability.
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1.

Impacts of Income Inequality

While there is little consensus in the literature on the exact consequences of income
inequality for a given society or community, many scholars posit that the effects are negative in
high-income countries. Declines in health, increased violence, political instability, prolonged
absolute poverty, a lack of social mobility, spatial segregation, and unequal access to and
distribution of resources and protections, are all negative impacts commonly cited in the
literature (Subramanian and Kawachi 2003; Kennedy et al. 1998; Cardoso 1972; Frank 2007;
Massey 1996; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Gornick and Jӓntti 2013).
While all of these impacts are both serious and alarming, this dissertation is most
concerned with how income inequality may be impacting spatial segregation and the distribution
of resources needed for adaptation, e.g., sea walls and health services. I take this more narrow
focus for it is through these two less obvious pathways that income inequality may relate to a
municipality’s level of vulnerability to climate change. While absolute poverty most plainly
relates to vulnerability, this relationship is not discussed in depth as it is already well-chartered
territory in the vulnerability literature (Adger 1999; Ribot 2011).
In middle-income countries, the impacts of income inequality can be more difficult to
categorize as wholly negative. Kuznets (1955) popularized the notion that rising income
inequality is a consequence of economic development, a trajectory called the Kuznets curve.
According to the Kuznets curve, as poorer societies develop, income inequality rises. Once they
transition to high-income countries, levels of income inequality begin to decline. As such, in
middle-income countries, higher income inequality may be an indicator of economic
development.
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Scholars of income inequality (Frank 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Kennedy et al.
1998) suggest that high levels of inequality lead to a breakdown of social cohesion, i.e., the
“willingness of members of society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper”
(Stanley 2003:1). While this weakening of social cohesion can manifest itself in many ways, the
most relevant to this dissertation is the link between social cohesion and resource access. Figure
3 below outlines the relationships between social cohesion, income inequality, access to
resources, assets and options, and vulnerability. This chapter is concerned with examining the
linkages displayed by the red arrows in the diagram, while Chapters 2 and 4 focus on the blue
arrow, the connection between resource access and vulnerability.

Figure 3. Concept Map: Relating Income Inequality and Vulnerability
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Income inequality is thought to break down social cohesion, which leads to both spatial
segregation and elites governing in their best interest. Thus, municipalities with higher income
inequality tend to be more spatially segregated (Massey 1996) and political power is often
concentrated in the elite class (Cardoso 1972). Elite influence can take two forms. The first is a
phenomenon known as “opting out” (Frank 2007), where elites direct public resources away
from public services they don’t need, such as adaptation infrastructure, and towards projects that
suit their own interests. An example of this might be directing public funding towards the
construction of Olympic stadiums, rather than improving drainage infrastructure in lower income
areas. Another form of elite influence is directing funds slated for adaptation for their own
benefit, such as building sea walls in elite neighborhoods, rather than in lower income
neighborhoods.
It is important to note that these relationships operate in both directions, i.e., elites
governing in their best interest can also lead to increased income inequality (Portes 2010). For
example, government officials may choose to reduce taxes on capital gains, a reform which
returns income to those at the higher end of the income distribution more than to those farther
down on the income distribution. While I do not explicitly measure the power of elites as part of
the vulnerability index, I do believe the role of elites is an important element in the relationship
between income inequality and vulnerability. As such, I include the elite actors in the conceptual
model, even though I do not include an indicator of vulnerability that directly captures their
influence. Instead, the relative levels of socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance
captured in the vulnerability index are all theorized to be, at least in part, the result of elites
governing in their own best interest.
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In their best-selling, though heavily critiqued, book The Spirit Level (2010), Wilkinson
and Pickett explain that income inequality and the resulting breakdown in social cohesion lead to
a host of impacts that are harmful to society. Income inequality cleaves society into distinct
classes, where the elite, who control the bulk of the resources, feel little connection to or
responsibility toward those who populate the rest of the income distribution. Klinenberg (2002),
in his discussion of the heat wave in Chicago, points to how income inequality led to the spatial
segregation of high and low-income communities, and how this spatial divide increased
vulnerability of Chicago residents to the heat wave. Government officials failed to designate
cooling centers or increase ambulance services to low-income communities during the initial
heat wave. Living in high-income, air-conditioned communities, officials were ostensibly
unaware that poor, elderly citizens in low-income communities on the city outskirts were dying
in their homes due to heat exhaustion.
Klinenberg (2002) also makes the point that neighborhoods with close-knit communities
with high levels of social cohesion suffer less than disparate neighborhoods during natural
disasters. He shows how two equally low-income neighborhoods weathered the heat wave
differently. Klinenberg suggests that the high level of social cohesion of the Latino community
led to fewer causalities, as neighbors helped each other manage the heat. While the level of
social cohesion within neighborhoods surely impacts vulnerability, this dissertation is concerned
with social cohesion between neighborhoods. As such, income inequality is measured at the
municipality, rather than the neighborhood level12.

12

Unfortunately socioeconomic data is not available at the neighborhood level. Therefore, the
level of social cohesion within neighborhoods could not be controlled for in the analysis.
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Massey (1996) also describes this phenomenon of how income inequality leads to spatial
segregation, in his work comparing urban areas in Chicago in the 1930s and the 1980s. He
explains that lower income communities are increasingly more geographically clustered and
isolated as a result of rising income inequality. He notes how these lower income urban
communities suffer, in part, due to inferior public resources access.
Massey (1996), Klinenberg (2002) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) all document the
impacts of income inequality in developed countries; however, there is also mounting evidence
of the negative impacts of income inequality in middle-income countries as well. Perlman
(2011), in her ethnographic study of favelas in Brazil in 1968, provides a vivid example of how
the lack of social cohesion, resulting from income inequality, leads to inequitable resource
distribution for the urban poor. Perlman asked a resident how he felt when he saw the luxury
homes in Rio de Janeiro while his own favela lacked the most basic services such as running
water and electricity. He responded: “After the government helps the rich and less rich, then,
later on, it will be our turn-our time will come” (Perlman 2011: Ch 8).
Increasing income inequality is also discussed at great length by scholars of urbanization
in the developing world (National Research Council 2003). These authors document how
increasing income inequality, often a consequence of urbanization, has led to increased spatial
segregation and the creation of slums and shanty-towns in cities in developing countries around
the globe. The elite classes, benefiting from a colonial history of uneven development, have
maintained power, and are thus able to control the bulk of urban resources and direct public
funds for their own benefit. This leaves the lower income families to cluster in geographically
isolated and marginalized communities, without access to even the most basic services, such as
clean water and sanitation facilities (Cardoso 1972; Frank 2000).
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In the context of developing, middle-income countries, it is important to mention the
relationship between income inequality and absolute poverty. Often the negative impacts of
income inequality are assumed to be simply a consequence of high levels of absolute poverty.
While absolute poverty undoubtedly contributes to vulnerability in developing countries
(Hardoy, Mitlin, and Satterthwaite 2001; McGranahan et al. 2007), this dissertation is more
concerned with the impacts of income inequality on the inequitable distribution of public
resources, as opposed to the link between income inequality and absolute poverty.
2.

Measuring Income Inequality

Measurements of income inequality capture the magnitude of the dispersion of income
along a defined distribution. Although the concept is relatively straight-forward, the myriad
methods of measuring income inequality are less so, and there is great debate in the literature
over which measures are most useful (Atkinson 1970; Charles-Coll 2011). The Gini index
measures the total income inequality that exists across the entire distribution. While this measure
is helpful in capturing overall levels of income inequality in a single summary statistic, it does
not show where along the income distribution the income inequality is located.
Another class of income inequality measures, the general entropy indexes, which include
the Theil index, have the added benefit of decomposition properties, where it is possible to
determine the levels at which different demographic groups of the population are contributing to
the overall income inequality, i.e., women or the elderly (Bourguignon 1979; Charles-Coll
2011). The generalized entropy measures are also common in assessing the spatial distribution
of income inequality (Center for International Earth Science Information Network-CIESINColumbia University 2005). However, these measures can be difficult to interpret. Charles-Coll
(2011) draws on Sen’s description of the Theil index to illuminate its complexity. “But the fact
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remains that it is an arbitrary formula, and the average of the logarithms of the reciprocals of
income shares weighted by income shares is not a measure that is exactly overflowing with
intuitive sense” (Sen 1973: 36).
To parsimoniously identify where the disparities in income occur along the distribution,
different classes of income inequality measures are available. The percentile ratio and income
share measures and ratios have the ability to identify where along the income distribution the
income inequality lies. The percentile ratio measures compare income levels at two points in the
income distribution. Examples of common percentile ratio measures include the 90th/50th
percentile ratio, which captures top half income inequality and the 50th/10th percentile ratio,
which captures the bottom half. Percentile ratio measures are not exclusively designed to capture
top or bottom half income inequality however. The 90th/10th percentile ratio and the 80th/20th
percentile ratio are often used to approximate overall income inequality across the entire
distribution.
Income share measures compare the total share of income held by a given proportion of
the population. For example, the income share of the top 10 percent is the percent of overall
income held by households located in the top 10 percent of the income distribution. In 2009, the
top 10 percent of households in Brazil held 42.9 percent of total national income (World Bank
2014a).
Income share measures can also be calculated as ratios. The Palma ratio, a relatively new
income inequality measure, is the ratio of the income share held by the top 10 percent of
households compared to the income share held by the bottom 40 percent of households (Cobham
and Sumner 2013; Palma 2011). The Palma ratio correlated closely with the Gini index at the
national level (Palma 2011).
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Income inequality can also be measured by incorporating assumptions about social
welfare within the calculation. Atkinson (1970) points to how measures of income inequality
inherently imply a value judgment about the nature of income inequality and social welfare, i.e.,
how averse a given society is to inequality. The Atkinson index (a family of measures), captures
this “normative” judgment by incorporating an inequality aversion parameter, ε, which allows
the researcher to select the level of inequality aversion, and thus which portion of the distribution
should receive more weight in the final calculation of inequality. As the inequality aversion
parameter approaches zero, more weight is placed on changes at the top of the income
distribution, while as the parameter approaches infinity, more weight is placed on the bottom end
(Allison 1978). Given this unique property of the Atkinson index, the ability to adjust the
inequality aversion parameter, the Atkinson index is well suited to measure inequality at
different portions of the distribution. In practice, the income inequality aversion parameter is
typically assigned values between 0.5 and 2 (De Maio 2007; Laporte 2002; Regidor et al. 2003).
Thus the Atkinson index with a parameter of 1 will be more sensitive to the income position of
those at the bottom of the distribution, as compared to an index calculated with the parameter set
to 0.5 (Jones Jr. and Weinberg 2000). The Atkinson index takes on values between 0 and 1, and
can be interpreted as the level of social welfare that could be achieved if incomes were evenly
distributed. The higher the Atkinson index value, the more social welfare that could be gained
through redistribution, and thus the higher the level of current inequality. Another common way
to apply the Atkinson index is by calculating the percentage of total income required to achieve
the same level of social welfare, if incomes were evenly distributed, where 1- Atkinson index =
percent of income. Thus an Atkinson index score of 0.2 indicates that 80 percent of total income
is required to achieve the same level of social welfare, if incomes were evenly distributed (De
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Maio 2007).
3.

Considering the Location of the Income Inequality along the Distribution

The Gini index is used by a host of income inequality scholars to measure the impacts of
income inequality on society and the economy (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Subramanian and
Kawachi 2003; Kenworthy 2004; Rodríguez 2000). However, scholars have found conflicting
evidence of its impacts. Kenworthy (2004), in his analysis of the impacts of income inequality on
economic growth, found no significant effect. Rodríguez (2000) notes that income inequality, as
measured by the Gini index, has been found to have negative impacts on growth.
Alderson, Beckfield and Nielsen (2005) employ a relative distribution measure to chart
the change in the distribution of incomes in high-income countries over time. They find that
increasing income inequality in the United States, since the late 1960’s, was a result of income
polarization. Their work highlights the range of income distributions possible under a single
summary measure of income inequality, and advocates for more careful analysis of the location
of income inequality along the distribution, rather than simply relying on summary measures
such as the Gini index, to understand shifts in income inequality over time.
Voitchovsky (2005), also aware of the limitations of the Gini index, employs income
share ratio measures in her work focused on determining the impacts of income inequality on
growth. She hypothesizes that top half and bottom half income inequality have differing impacts
on economic growth, and thus one cannot employ a summary measure, such as the Gini index, to
test her hypothesis. She finds that while top half income inequality has positive impacts on
economic growth, bottom half income inequality depresses growth. In her work, she measures
top half income inequality as the ratio of the income share held by the top quintile to the middle
quintile (Q5/Q3). Bottom half income inequality she measures as the ratio of the income share
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held by the middle quintile to the income share held by the bottom quintile (Q3/Q1).
Voitchovsky selects the quintile ratio measures, as opposed to the percentile ratio measures (i.e.,
90th/50th and 50th/10th) to ensure that potential measurement error at the bottom and top ends
of the distribution would not unfairly bias results.
Acknowledging the complex nature of the relationship between income inequality and
economic performance, Voitchovsky (2014) conducted a meta-analysis, reviewing over 70
empirical works. While she finds much disagreement in the literature, Voitchovsky also
identifies a few conditions which appear to hold true across the multitude of competing evidence.
These include that income inequality may have a positive impact on economic performance in
the short term, and a negative effect in the long term, and that inequality of opportunities (human
capital as opposed to strictly income measures) may have negative effects on economic growth.
Voitchovsky concludes that the effects of income inequality on economic performance are likely
context specific. Instead of attempting to identify a panacea effect, she advocates for a more
nuanced exploration of the impacts of income inequality, such as whether incomes clustered at
the top of the distribution tend to stymie overall economic growth.
Robert Frank, in his book, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle
Class (2007), explains how rising incomes at the top of the income distribution, are harmful to
the middle class in the United States. He argues that this type of top-heavy income distribution,
when the top five to ten percent has an increasingly larger share of total income, is problematic,
as these high-income households drive prices of basic goods, such as housing and education, out
of reach for many middle class families, and force struggling families to work overtime and take
on excess debt.
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The negative impacts of this top-heavy type of income distribution, often measured as the
distance between incomes at the top of the income distribution (i.e., top end income inequality),
have also been addressed by development scholars. Portes (2010) argues that when institutions
are controlled by elites, the under classes in upper-middle income countries are vulnerable to
exploitation. When there is significant income concentrated at the top of the distribution, elitedominated institutions fail to protect and promote the interests of all members of society. Top
end income inequality, and the power it bestows on elites to allocate state resources according to
their own interests, is a well-documented theme which runs through much of the globalization
and development literatures (Roberts and Hite 2007). There are cases where top end income
inequality can work in favor of more equitable resource allocation and poverty alleviation. This
is the case in welfare states (Brady 2005; Scruggs and Allan 2006), i.e., societies with highly
progressive tax systems and/or generous benefit programs, such as Sweden, where taxes and
transfers significantly reduce income inequality (Jäntti 1997; Förster and Vleminckx 2004). This
type of redistribution is rarely observed in middle-income or low-income countries.
By employing several different measures of income inequality to test the hypothesis of
whether income inequality impacts vulnerability, this analysis will add to the subsection of
income inequality literature, briefly captured above, which focuses on not just the presence of
income inequality and its impacts, but also the relevance of its location along the income
distribution.

B.

Data and Methods

To measure income and income inequality in Brazil, I use household data from the 2010
Brazilian census hosted in the Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (IPUMS) International
database. The survey data provide a measure of gross individual monthly income. Gross income
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includes both earned income and income from transfers including pensions and social welfare
programs. It does not include non-cash or near cash transfers.13 I include data from all
households, both rural and urban, within urban municipalities.
To calculate income, I convert the gross individual monthly income to equivalized
household income. First I sum all individual incomes within each household to obtain total gross
household income. Next I equivalize total household income to account for economies of scale,
according to the following formula:
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ÷ √# 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
I use the square root of the household size as this is the halfway point between the
assumption of perfect economies of scale and zero economies of scale within the household. This
method is commonly used in the Luxembourg Income Study literature to account for economies
of scale within households (Voitchovsky 2005)14.
There are a variety of approaches in the spatial demographic literature for creating small
area estimates of poverty and inequality. These methods are typically based on combining census
data with a smaller sample of household survey data (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 2002;
Hentschel at al. 1998). The Elbers et al. approach is useful when income or infant mortality data
are not in the census data, but are available in a smaller sample of household surveys.

13

I use pre-tax, gross income as this is the only income measure available from the Brazilian
census. This is a measure of cash income from all sources including earned, capital and transfers.
14
While the selection of the square root of the total number of household members (i.e., the
number of household members to the power of 0.5) is a common choice for equivalizing
household income, a range of values between 0.2 and 0.8 have also been employed by income
inequality scholars. Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) find that measures of income inequality
are sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale. The selection of 0.5, a parameter that estimates
the halfway point between perfect and zero economies of scale, is however, commonly accepted
as a suitable measure in the income inequality literature.
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Fortunately, where income is concerned, the Brazilian census is comprehensive and data are
representative to the municipality level. As such I follow the convention of Potter, Schmertmann,
and Cavenaghi (2002) and aggregate individual income data to construct equivalized household
income. I then calculate income inequality within the municipality using equivalized household
income.
To examine whether the effects of income inequality are different depending on where
along the income distribution the income inequality is located, I calculate income inequality
within municipalities using seven different measures: one summary measure (Gini index), two
measures of both bottom and top half income inequality and two specifications of the Atkinson
Index with ε= 0.5 and with ε= 115.
I select the Gini index as it is most commonly used to measure income inequality in the
vulnerability literature. Taking Voitchovsky’s (2005) concerns to heart, that percentile ratios
may be vulnerable to measurement error, I employ both percentile and income share ratios to
capture top and bottom half inequality. I use the 90th/50th percentile ratio and the mean values
of the income shares of the 5th quintile over the 3rd quintile (mean of Q5/mean of Q3) to
measure top half income inequality. I use the 50th/10th percentile ratio and the mean of Q3/mean
of Q1 income share ratio to measure bottom half income inequality16. Lastly, I use two versions

I also calculated the Atkinson Index with ε= 2, however the mean score was 0.98 with a
standard deviation of 0.027. 99 percent of municipalities had scores above 0.93. Given the lack
of variation in the scores under this specification of the Atkinson Index, it is not suitable for
determining the impacts of income inequality on vulnerability in this dissertation.
16
In two municipalities, Santo Antônio do Içá and São Gabriel da Cachoeira, both located in the
North region in the state of Amazonas, the mean value of Q1 was equal to zero. In twenty-four
municipalities, the 10th percentile income was equal to zero. For these zero values, I impute the
minimum value in order to calculate the inequality measures. While there is no consensus in the
literature on how best to handle zero values in income inequality calculations, imputing the
minimum value is an acceptable method to manage this. Another common method is to impute
15
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of the Atkinson Index with the inequality aversion parameter set to 0.5 and 1.17 A key difference
between the Atkinson and Gini Index measures on the one hand, and the percentile and income
share ratio measures on the other, is the scope of the calculations. The latter set only contain data
on one segment of the distribution in relation to another. The former consider the entire
distribution in the calculations. For example, the 90th/50th percentile ratio only contains
information about two points within the top half of the income distribution (the 90th and the 50th
percentiles). The Atkinson Index (0.5), the measure of top end income inequality, contains
information about the entire income distribution and calculates not just the distance between the
top incomes and the middle, but the distances between all incomes, weighting distances at the
top more than distances at the bottom.
Table III-1 displays each income inequality measure I use in the analysis, along with a
brief description of the key strengths and weaknesses of each.

the value of one for zero values. I do not use this convention as there is no theoretical
justification for this method, and it results in vastly larger standard deviations. As this
dissertation is concerned with comparative levels of income inequality under different measures,
imputing the minimum value for zero values is preferable to imputing the value of one, which
may overestimate income inequality. The majority of people with zero monthly gross income are
not in the labor force (83.2 percent), while 14.4 percent are unemployed. For individuals who
have irregular income or did not work in the past month, the monthly income reported should
represent the average monthly income earned over the past year. Thus it is likely that individuals
in households which report zero income subsist off the land, even though they are not officially
working as part of the agricultural labor force.
17
As it is not possible to compute the Atkinson index with zero values, for individuals with zero
equivalized household income, I impute the minimum income value of $R 0.41.
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Table III-1. Income Inequality Measures: Strengths and Weaknesses
Income Inequality
Measure
Gini Index

Type

Strength

Weakness

Summary
measure

Commonly used and
easy to interpret

Cannot identify where
along the distribution
the income inequality
lies

Atkinson (0.5)

Top end

Not very intuitive

Atkinson (1)

Bottom end

90th/50th

Top half

Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
distances between
incomes at the top end
of the distribution
Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
distances between
incomes at the lower
end of the distribution
Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
gaps between the top
and the middle

Mean Q5/Q3

Top half

Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
gaps between the top
and the middle

Does not include any
information about
bottom half of
distribution

50th/10th

Bottom half

Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
gaps between the
middle and the bottom

Does not include any
information about top
half of distribution;
Sensitive to zero
incomes at the 10th
percentile

Mean Q3/Q1

Bottom half

Able to assess impacts
of inequality due to
gaps between the
middle and the bottom

Does not include any
information about top
half of distribution

Not very intuitive

Does not include any
information about
bottom half of
distribution or those
above the 90th
percentile
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C.

Income Inequality within Municipalities

I calculate income inequality within each of the 1276 urban municipalities in Brazil
across 25 states. To highlight the difference in levels of income inequality within each
municipality, depending on which measure is employed, I map the seven different measures of
income inequality below. I also include inland flood hazard, defined by the number of projected
floods per 100 years, and coastal flood hazard, defined as low elevation coastal zones, to display
the breadth of flood hazards across Brazil. While the Northwestern Amazon region and coastal
areas are undoubtedly at risk, there are also considerable flood risks in urban municipalities
across the nation (EMDAT 2014).
In order to facilitate easier comparison across measures, I map income inequality scores
by tercile, defining high income inequality as the top tercile, medium income inequality as the
middle tercile and low income inequality as the bottom tercile, for each measure. Using terciles
to compare income inequality measures allows for easier visible detection of municipalities that
may score high on one measure, relative to other municipalities, but average or low on another
measure. One weakness of using terciles is that the number of municipalities categorized as
having high, medium and low levels of income inequality are the same under each measure, i.e.,
approximately 425 municipalities fall into each category for every measure. Thus, it is important
to remember that these categories are simply a tool to illustrate relative levels of income
inequality under each measures in each municipality, and not an absolute categorization of level
of income inequality in each municipality.
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Map 11.Gini Index of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 12. Atkinson Index (0.5) of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 13. Atkinson Index (1.0) of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 14. Mean Q5/Mean Q3 of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 15. 90th/50th of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 16. Mean Q3/Mean Q1 of Brazilian Municipalities
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Map 17. 50th/10th of Brazilian Municipalities
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It is clear that income inequality varies significantly across municipalities, and
that the relative level (high, medium, low) of income inequality within a municipality
does vary, in some cases, depending on the measurement tool employed. For example,
several municipalities in the Southwest have relatively high levels of income inequality
as measured by the Gini index, and relatively high levels of top half income inequality;
however, they also have average or low levels of bottom half income inequality.
Another way to compare the relative magnitude and location of income inequality
along the distribution across municipalities is to categorize municipalities by income
inequality type. In Figure 4 below, I use the mean Q3/Q1 to define bottom half income
inequality and mean Q5/Q3 for top half income inequality. I divide income inequality
magnitude into two groups, high and low, where high is a ratio value of 3 or above, and
low is a ratio below 3. For example, municipalities in which the mean Q5/Q3 ratios (the
average of the top 20 percent income share over the average of the middle twenty percent
income share) are three or above are categorized as having high top half income
inequality.
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Figure 4. Percent of Municipalities by Income Inequality Type and Magnitude
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014
It is clear that while the majority of municipalities have both top and bottom half
income inequality, more municipalities have high top half income inequality, compared
to those with high bottom half income inequality.
To examine the relationships across income inequality measures in more detail, I
calculate the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient between each measure. The Pearson’s r
correlation coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a perfect correlation and 0
denotes no relationship. 0.4 to 0.6 is considered to be a moderate correlation while 0.7 to
0.9 signifies a strong correlation between variables (Dancey and Reidy 2004). As income
inequality and its impacts on vulnerability are linked to absolute poverty, I also examine
the correlation between each income inequality measure, and the percentage of the
population in the municipality in absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is calculated as the
proportion of those in a municipality with equivalized household monthly income below
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R$ 233.51, the poverty threshold used by the OECD for Latin America (see Chapter 2 for
specific calculations). In Table III-2, I provide descriptive statistics for each of the seven
inequality measures, and the level of absolute poverty for each municipality, all of which
vary considerably across municipalities.
Table III-2. Descriptive Statistics of Income Inequality Measures and Absolute Poverty
Rates
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Gini Index

0.47

0.05

0.32

0.68

Atkinson Index (0.5)

0.20

0.04

0.09

0.45

Atkinson Index (1)

0.42

0.10

0.19

0.93

90th/50th

2.89

0.49

1.94

7.05

Mean Q5/Q3

3.75

0.65

2.20

6.99

50th/10th

4.66

6.51

1.75

128.57

Mean Q3/Q1

4.59

7.78

1.89

209.11

Absolute Poverty Rate

13.69% 11.22% 0.25% 58.03%

n=1276 urban municipalities
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014.
Table III-3 displays the correlation coefficients for the seven income inequality
measures and the level of absolute poverty within each municipality.
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Table III-3. Correlation Coefficients of Income Inequality Measures and Absolute
Poverty Rates
Gini
Index

Atkinson
(0.5)

Atkinson
(1.0)

90th
/50th

Mean
Q5/Q3

50th
/10th

Mean
Q3/Q1

Gini Index

1.00

Atkinson (0.5)

0.98

1.00

Atkinson (1)

0.98

0.98

1.00

90th/50th

0.70

0.61

0.60

1.00

Mean Q5/Q3

0.91

0.84

0.88

0.86

1.00

50th/10th

0.35

0.45

0.37

0.11

0.19

1.00

Mean Q3/Q1

0.34

0.42

0.37

0.21

0.27

0.46

1.00

Absolute
Poverty Rate

0.66

0.74

0.70

0.15

0.37

0.40

0.33

Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014.

It is worth noting that the two measures which aim to capture top half income
inequality, the 90th/50th and the mean Q5/Q3, are unsurprisingly highly correlated, with
a coefficient of 0.86. The lower correlation for the two measures which attempt to capture
bottom half income inequality, the 50th/10th and mean Q3/Q1, at 0.46, could be due to
the treatment of zero values in the 50th/10th percentile measure, as twenty-four
municipalities reported zero income at the 10th percentile. Interestingly, the Gini index is
more strongly correlated to measures of top half, rather than bottom half inequality. This
confirms the previously illustrated finding (see Figure 4) that more of the income
inequality within municipalities in Brazil is likely attributable to top half, rather than
bottom half income inequality. The larger prevalence of top half income inequality in
2010 may be partially explained by Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2013)
findings that income inequality declined in Brazil between 2000 and 2010 due to an
increase in incomes at the bottom of the distribution, particularly due to progressive
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government transfers. This reduction in bottom half income inequality could explain
why, by 2010, top half income inequality is so much more significant than bottom half. It
is also likely that top half income inequality has been consistently larger than bottom half
income inequality, and even though overall income inequality has declined, top half
income inequality has not followed suit.
The Atkinson measures correlate most closely with the Gini index, which is
unsurprising as both the Gini and the Atkinson indexes measure inequality across the
entire distribution, whereas the top and bottom half measures only include data from their
respective portions of the distribution. Interestingly the Atkinson index with parameter of
0.5, which is less sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution, correlates more
closely with absolute poverty, compared to the 1.0 specification, suggesting absolute
poverty is more closely related to top end, rather than bottom end inequality.
The Atkinson index with parameter 1.0, which is more sensitive to the bottom end
of the distribution, does not correlate closely with the two measures of bottom half
inequality. This is likely due to the fact that even though this specification of the
Atkinson Index does weight bottom incomes more heavily, it still takes the entire
distribution into account. As the lion’s share of the income inequality is in the top half of
the distribution, it follows that bottom half measures would only weakly correlate with
measures of the entire distribution.
The weak correlations between absolute poverty and most income inequality
measures, and particularly top half income inequality measures, are important to keep in
mind when presented with the models analyzing the relationship between income
inequality and vulnerability. Map 18 shows the distribution of absolute poverty rates
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across urban municipalities. While absolute poverty rates follow a similar pattern to
income inequality measures, they are not identical.
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Map 18. Absolute Poverty Rates of Brazilian Municipalities
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A common critique of models that attempt to parse out the impacts of income
inequality is the notion that income inequality is simply a measure of absolute poverty in
developing nations. The extremely weak correlation between top half income inequality
and absolute poverty (the correlation between absolute poverty and the 90th/50th ratio is
0.15) is evidence that top half income inequality can be divorced from absolute poverty
and therefore the inclusion of both measures as independent variables within a single
regression model does not create serious problems of multicollinearity.
More surprising perhaps, is the weak correlation between bottom half income
inequality and absolute poverty. This is likely due to low levels of median incomes. 605
municipalities (47 percent) have absolute poverty levels above 10 percent and 349
municipalities (27 percent) have levels above 20 percent, while 25 percent of
municipalities have median incomes below $R 460, less than twice the absolute poverty
line. This suggests that some municipalities with higher rates of absolute poverty may
actually have lower levels of bottom half income inequality, a situation common in
poorer countries though counter-intuitive from a developed county perspective, where
median incomes are substantially higher than the absolute poverty line. Map 19 shows
municipalities with absolute poverty rates above 16 percent (the highest tercile cut-off),
and relatively low to moderate levels of bottom half income inequality (as measured by
50th/10th percentile ratios). Fifty-five municipalities have both high rates of absolute
poverty and relatively low to moderate levels of bottom half income inequality.
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Map 19. Absolute Poverty and Bottom Half Income Inequality
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In the next chapter, drawing on the seven income inequality measures outlined
above, I analyze the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability to flooding
in Brazil. By testing the predictive power of each income inequality measure separately, I
will be able to distinguish not just whether income inequality is a predictor of
vulnerability, but more precisely, I will also be able to determine whether the impact of
income inequality differs depending on its location along the income distribution.
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IV. Is Income Inequality a Predictor of Vulnerability to
Flooding?
In the previous chapters I provide a brief review of two separate, yet conceptually
overlapping literatures in the field of sociology: income inequality and vulnerability. In
this next section, I unite the two by testing whether income inequality is a predictor of
vulnerability of urban municipalities. To test this hypothesis, I use multi-level regression
models, which allow for controls at both the state and municipality level. To parse out
whether the observed relationship between income inequality and vulnerability is actually
just a consequence of absolute poverty levels in a given municipality, I control for the
percentage of individuals living below the absolute poverty line in each municipality.

A.

Linking Income Inequality and Vulnerability Literatures

The vulnerability literature, and particularly the inherent urban vulnerability
framework, suggest that socioeconomic inequalities drive the level of vulnerability in a
given place, apart from the environmental or climatic conditions to which the denizens
are exposed. Poverty is typically part of the story and vulnerability scholars point to the
difficulties poor households face, both during the disaster and the recovery periods (Ribot
2011). Income inequality, aside from its relationship to absolute poverty, is also
considered by some vulnerability experts (Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005; Adger 1999)
to play a significant role in increasing vulnerability. Income inequality creates spatial
segregation by income level, allowing the high-income groups to silo themselves in safe
spaces while the lower income groups are left to settle in more dangerous, unprotected
locations. Bapista and Adamo (2014), in a study of disaster declarations in response to
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excessive rainfall in Southern Brazil, found that the municipality which experienced the
most damage had a significant population living in informal settlements. “These informal
settlements often occupy areas along waterways and on steep hillslopes, which are highly
vulnerable to flooding and landslides” (Baptista and Adamo 2014). Residents built
settlements in unsafe areas as they could not afford housing in the city centers. This
example of residential segregation due to income inequality has been well-documented
by sociologists (Massey 1996). Of course it is not always the case that only the lowincome households are exposed to flood hazard. While both high-income and low-income
groups may be exposed, higher income households are more likely to have the resources
to protect themselves.
A second link between income inequality and vulnerability is the question of
resource access. Adger (1999) and Klinenberg (2002) both provide compelling examples
of how income inequality creates situations where government resources are allocated
according to the priorities of the high-income, governing class. In the case of coastal
areas in Vietnam, Adger (1999) describes how sea walls were constructed in areas around
the homes of the high-income elite, while the rest of the population went unprotected.
Klinenberg (2002) describes how an insufficient number of cooling centers and
ambulances were allocated to residents during the heat wave, resulting in hundreds of
deaths. Government officials living in air conditioned mansions in high-income suburbs
were unaware of, or possibly even unconcerned by, the dire conditions of aging residents
who lacked the basic education to protect themselves from the heat, and who lived in
neighborhoods without health care or social service facilities.
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In this chapter, I test whether income inequality is a predictor of these conditions
of spatial segregation and inequitable resource access and allocation that result in
vulnerability. By measuring the vulnerability levels of 1276 urban municipalities in
Brazil and analyzing their relationship with income inequality, I hope to buttress the
above claims that income inequality, aside from its relationship to absolute poverty, is a
statistically significant predictor of vulnerability.
Income inequality, as briefly covered in Chapter 3, is both a single concept and a
multitude of measures. To understand whether the location of the income inequality
along the income distribution impacts its relationship to vulnerability, I test seven
different income inequality measures. If all measures of income inequality equally predict
vulnerability to flooding, this finding will suggest that the location of the income
inequality along the distribution is irrelevant. However, if the different measures of
income inequality have a range of predictive power and statistical significance, this will
provide evidence that the type of income inequality, not just income inequality in general,
is material in regards to its relationship to vulnerability. Thus, by testing seven measures
of income inequality, I can identify not simply whether income inequality in general, is a
predictor of vulnerability, but also which type of income inequality along the distribution
is the most significant predictor of vulnerability, controlling for absolute poverty.

B.

Data

To test the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability, I draw on
several datasets. For the vulnerability measure, I use a vulnerability index constructed
from household survey data, municipality data, and spatial datasets which provide
information on location of primary roads, coastal areas and elevation (see Chapter 2 for
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specifics on index construction). To measure income inequality and absolute poverty at
the municipality level, I draw on income data provided in household surveys (see Chapter
3 for a detailed description of income inequality and absolute poverty measure
calculations). Table IV-1 lists the data source and type for each control variable in the
models.
Table IV-1. Data Sources
Variables
Inland flood
frequency
Coastal flood
exposure
Municipality
size
Aridity level
Percent in
absolute
poverty
Region
variables

Data Source
Flood frequency, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk
Reduction and night time lights (GAR 2011; NOAA 2010)
Low elevation coastal zones and night time lights (McGranahan
et al. 2007; NOAA 2010)
Municipality population, IBGE 2011 Municipality Report
(IGBE 2011)
Global aridity, Consortium for Spatial Information
(CGIAR-CSI 2012)

IBGE 2010 census (Minnesota Population Center 2014)
Region classification, IBGE 2011 Municipality Report
(IBGE 2011)

Data
Type
Spatial
Spatial
Numerical
Spatial

Numerical
Numerical

To control for exposure to environmental hazards, which may also contribute to the
vulnerability of a given municipality, I use flood frequency data from the Global
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR 2011). These data provide a
measure of inland flood frequency, which is the total number of inland floods projected
to occur in an area within 100 years. To identify which areas of the municipality are
urban, I use data from NOAA 2010, which categorizes urban areas using satellite data of
night time lights (NOAA 2010). I also include an aridity measure from the Consortium
for Spatial Information (CGIAR-CSI 2012). This spatial dataset categorizes the aridity
level of a given area using an aridity index (AI) value. The AI is calculated as the ratio of
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the mean annual precipitation (MAP) over the mean annual potential evapo-transpiration
(MAE) observed between 1950 and 2000 (CGIAR-CSI 2012). To identify whether the
urban areas within a municipality are located in low elevation coastal zones (LECZ), I
use the LECZ 2010 data, which map the contiguous areas from the coast less than 10
meters above sea level. The LECZ data include inland deltas which are vulnerable to sealevel rise (McGranahan et al. 2007).
To control for the influence of the political economy of states on vulnerability, I
use the Division into Regions macro region dataset provided by the IBGE. This dataset
groups Brazilian states into five regions: north, northeast, southeast, south and central
west. This region designation, originally used in the 1940s as a way to organize Brazilian
national statistics, is now more commonly applied as a lens for understanding the
historical and current political economies in Brazil. The IBGE proscribes the use of this
classification for formulation of public policy as the regions segment the country based
on the history of economic and social development, natural environment, and
communication and commerce networks (IBGE 2014). In Transforming Brazil: A Reform
Era in Perspective (Font 2003), an in-depth analysis of reform and development policies
in modern Brazil, Font explains that “the enduring significance of regionalism and class
relations” (Font 2003:10) remain, and continue to influence relationships between
political actors at all levels of society.

C.

Methods

I use multi-level regression models to test whether income inequality is a
predictor of vulnerability to flooding for urban municipalities in Brazil. The lower unit of
analysis is the municipality, with the vulnerability index score of the municipality as the
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dependent variable. At the upper level, the state level, I control for the political economy
of states using the Division into Regions classification.
At the municipality level, I control for aridity, coastal flood hazard in urban areas,
inland flood frequency in urban areas, the percent of the population below the absolute
poverty line and the municipality population size .The IBGE groups municipalities into
seven size categories (IBGE 2011). I follow this convention and group municipalities
based on the IBGE size classifications. The IBGE municipality size classification is listed
in Table IV-2 below.
Table IV-2. Municipality Size Classification
Size Classification
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Source: IBGE 2011.

Population
< 5,000
5,001-10,000
10,001-20,000
20,001-50,000
50,001-100,000
100,001-500,000
500,001 +

I account for the spatial autocorrelation of municipality vulnerability (identified in
Chapter 2) using the multi-level model structure. Table IV-3 contains descriptive
statistics for all variables in all the models, save the income inequality measures (listed in
Chapter 3).
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Table IV-3. Descriptive Statistics for Multi-Level Model Variables
Mean
Municipality-level Variables
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute
poverty
State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted
category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Dependent Variables
Vulnerability index
score
Socioeconomic status
Infrastructure quality
Governance

SD

Min

Max

2.4945
0.1622
4.6583
0.6897
0.1369

5.8667
0.3688
0.9242
1.2043
0.1122

0.0000 48.0000
0.0000 1.0000
3.0000 7.0000
0.0000 3.0000
0.0025 0.5803

0.3723

0.4836

0.0000

1.0000

0.0768
0.3111
0.1716
0.0682

0.2664
0.4631
0.3772
0.2522

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.2810

0.3606 -0.5662

2.0532

0.2926
0.1202
0.6938

0.1859 -0.3003
0.1560 -0.6065
0.2657 0.1713

0.6519
0.4521
1.5552

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007
The key independent variable in the models is income inequality. The dependent
variable, the vulnerability index score, is a composite measure which is comprised of
three main factors: socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance. To test which
components of vulnerability income inequality is best able to predict, I also run the
models substituting each of the three factors as the dependent variable.
In Chapter 3, I examined the relationships between the seven different measures
of income inequality and absolute poverty. I found that the Gini index, the Atkinson
index (1.0) and the Atkinson index (0.5) are correlated with absolute poverty, with

126

Pearson’s r correlation coefficients of 0.66, 0.70 and 0.74, respectively. Given the
potential for a multicollinearity problem in the model, I calculate the Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) for the variables. Following standard convention (O’Brien 2007), I conclude
that multicollinearity is not a serious concern as the variance inflation factors for all
variables are below five.
Given that even moderate collinearity between variables in a regression model
may unfairly bias p-values of independent variables, I also use a secondary significance
test. To test whether income inequality measures are predictors of vulnerability, aside
from their relationship with absolute poverty, I compare the model fit statistic of these
models (the deviance measure), to the model without an income inequality measure. In
this way, I can ascertain whether a model which includes a measure of income inequality,
is significantly different, in terms of predictive power, from a model which does not
include any measure of income inequality.

D.

A Discussion of Control Variables
1.

Political History and Economy of Brazilian Regions

In order to test whether income inequality is a predictor municipality
vulnerability, I need to control for several factors at both the state and municipality level.
The political economy and level of development of Brazilian states may be impacting
municipality vulnerability. Brazil has developed unevenly, with the Southeastern region
most economically prosperous and the Northeastern region most destitute (Da Veiga, da
Cunha, and Sichieri 2004). To account for the differences in the political economy and
level of development across states, I use a region variable, which codes states into the
five geographic and economic regions determined by the IBGE. I use the Southeastern
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region as the reference group as this region is the most prosperous and municipalities in
this region have the lowest vulnerability scores, on average. Table IV-4 displays the
demographic characteristics of urban municipalities by region.
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Table IV-4. Regional Demographics of Urban Municipalities in Brazil (2010)

Population
% of population
Territory (%)
Average
municipality
equivalized median
monthly household
income (R$)
Average % of rural
households per
urban municipality
Average
municipality
absolute poverty
rate
Average
municipality
education score
Average
municipality health
score
% of municipalities
with slums
% of municipalities
in LECZ
Average
municipality
vulnerability index
score
Average
municipality
socioeconomic
status score

North
Northeast
Southeast
South
Central West
10,700,000 35,400,000
70,400,000 20,300,000
8,324,518
7.4%
24.4%
48.5%
14.0%
5.7%
45.3%
18.3%
10.9%
6.8%
18.9%
R$ 517
R$ 429
R$ 880
R$ 976
R$ 781

26.5%

26.9%

10.6%

12.5%

13.8%

22.5%

25.4%

6.8%

5.3%

8.9%

0.65

0.66

0.86

0.78

0.76

0.68

0.74

0.85

0.88

0.83

43.9%

35.5%

33.1%

42.9%

12.6%

19.4%

23.9%

12.0%

26.0%

0.0%

0.85

0.41

0.11

0.22

0.16

0.12

0.10

0.40

0.45

0.37

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007
Map 20 displays the regions of Brazil and the average urban municipality
equivalized median monthly household income (R$). Map 20 also includes all primary
roads in Brazil. The Northern region has very few primary roads, compared to the other
four regions.
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Map 20. Regions of Brazil
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While there is considerable debate in the literature as to why Brazilian regions
developed so unevenly and remain so, there is also consensus that regional inequalities
can likely be traced back to the 19th century (Weinstein 1982). By the mid 1850’s,
Brazil’s economy was heavily driven by agriculture exports, mainly cotton, sugar and
coffee. Cotton and sugar were produced in the Northeastern region while coffee was
farmed in the Southeast. Leff (1972) attributes the uneven regional development to
Brazilian competitive advantage in coffee, relative to sugar and coffee. By the end of the
19th century, coffee exports has significantly outpaced both sugar and cotton production.
The demand for Brazilian coffee resulted in a strengthening of the Brazilian currency, a
boon for the Southeastern region, yet a blow to the Northeastern sugar and cotton
producers who could not complete with cheaper producers of sugar and cotton elsewhere,
particularly in Louisiana and Cuba. As a result of booming coffee exports, the Southeast
was able to industrialize and urbanize while the Northeast become increasingly more
impoverished. Weinstein (1982) explains how “regionalism became a fundamental fact of
political life for the Brazilian elites” (Weinstein 1982:263).
In 1889, Brazil secured its independence from Portugal and began a slow
transition from colony to republic. The era from 1889-1930 is often referred to as the
period of development of the “Old Republic.” During this period, there was a great effort
to decentralize and return political control to the local levels. In the remote Northern and
Northeastern regions, municipal governments were often controlled by the land owning
elite, and thus decentralization resulted in further empowering the local elites (Lewin
1987).
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During the “Old Republic”, there was little effort put forth by the federal
government to smooth development between regions (Lewin 1987). The Brazil
Revolution in 1930 ushered in the Vargas Era, led by Getulio Vargas, a native of Rio
Grande do Sul, a state in the Southern region. Although the Great Depression led to the
collapse of the export economy in Brazil, under Vargas’s quasi-dictatorship (Vargas
appointed all state governors), Brazil’s economy grew, and the nation began to rapidly
urbanize (Love 1970). However, economic growth was concentrated in the Southeast and
rural areas remained underdeveloped.
After the Vargas era, Brazil was under military rule and only began to transition
back to democracy in the 1970s. Neoliberal economic reforms were not put forth in
earnest until 1994. By the early 2000s, Brazil had successfully transitioned into what
Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) term a form of deliberative representation regime, one
where there is purportedly egalitarian access to political opportunities. However, the
regional divide in economic development in still clearly apparent.
Tompkins, Lemos, and Boyd (2008) point to how good governance is still
lacking in the Northeastern region. Funds slated for drought alleviation adaptation
programs are often either directly deposited into pockets of elite politicians, or used for
short-term hand-outs to secure votes, rather than towards long-term programs, which are
what the region truly requires.
The Northern region of Brazil is the least developed, comprised mostly of jungle.
As a frontier region, rapid development is expected in the coming decades (Nepstad et al.
2002). There is increasing pressure from the growing population to build roads and
improve economic opportunities. As recently as 1970, the Northern region had the
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highest fertility rate of all the regions, at 8.27 (Barbieri et al. 2010). The newly
urbanizing areas are still less developed, compared to those in the Southern regions. The
average socioeconomic status for urban municipalities in the Northern region, as
measured by the vulnerability index (see Ch 2), is only 0.12, significantly below that of
the Southeastern (0.40), Southern (0.45) and Central Western (0.37) regions. The
Northeastern region, at 0.10, has the lowest socioeconomic status score of any region.
Given the political history and current economic development levels of the
regions, scholars often consider region as a variable representing political economy
and/or geo-political development in their analyses. Hervitz (1985), in his study of the
effects of migration on fertility, categorizes the South and Southeast regions as modern,
while the North and Northeastern regions as traditional, given their higher fertility rates
and lower levels of economic development. Da Silva, Costa, and Macedo (2008) analyze
the appetite for development of a sustainable urban transit model and find regional
differences in priorities. The Northern region was the only region to give equal weight to
social, economic, and environmental priorities, signaling that this region, more than any
other, is most in need of development of all three sectors.
Menezes-Filho and Scorzafave (2011), in an effort to understand labor market
participation in Brazil, control for region (as a categorical variable) and find that
compared to those in the Central West region, people in the North and Northeast are less
likely to have formal employment, while those in the South and Southeast are more likely
to have formal employment. These relationships are reversed for informal employment.
Unemployment is also higher in the Northern and Northeastern regions, compared to the
Southern and Southeastern regions.
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Although Brazilian regions face different political, environmental, and economic
realities, there is no evidence of region-wide climate change adaptation policies. Climate
change adaptation policies are implemented at the municipality level (Puppim de Oliveira
2009), even though there is an acknowledgement that it would be wise to implement
policies that are successful in one municipality in other municipalities within the same
region. This is particularly true of small-scale efforts to adapt to drought in the
Northeastern region (Obermaier et al. 2009).
2.

Environmental Hazards

I include control variables in the model which measure the extent to which
municipalities have been exposed to environmental hazards, which in turn may have
impacted the vulnerability to flooding of urban populations. The environmental hazards
literature details how populations exposed to extreme weather, such as droughts and
flooding, are often more vulnerable to future hazards (Smith 2013). Environmental
justice scholars (Walker 2012) also point to how flooding and drought impact the social
vulnerability of populations at risk. To control for these impacts, I include several
environmental hazard variables in the model. These variables include the aridity level, the
projected inland flood frequency within urban areas, and whether or not the urban
settlements within a given municipality are located within low elevation coastal zones, a
proxy for coastal flooding. Although these measures do not encapsulate all environmental
hazards which may have impacted urban populations, such as heat waves or earthquakes,
they do capture the most frequent and destructive hazards, drought and flooding, that
urban populations in Brazil must contend with (EM-DAT 2014a).

134

I construct the aridity variable by assigning the maximum aridity value observed
in the municipality. To calculate the projected inland flood frequency within urban areas,
I use ArcGIS software to identify the maximum flood frequency value of each urban area
within a municipality. I identify urban areas within municipalities using the night time
lights data (NOAA 2010). Next I sum the maximum flood frequencies of each urban area
in the municipality to obtain a final value for inland flood frequencies within urban areas
of the given municipality. To identify coastal flood hazard, i.e., urban settlements located
within low elevation coastal zones, I combine night time lights data and LECZ data to
identify whether or not urban areas within a municipality fall within low elevation coastal
zones. The coastal flooding variable is binary given the varying size of urban areas within
coastal areas and the resolution of data. I experimented with summing the total number of
urban areas that fall within low elevation coastal zones within municipalities. However,
given the varying size of urban areas, this method was not a reliable way to differentiate
the magnitude of coastal flood hazard across municipalities.18
3.

Spatial Autocorrelation

In Chapter 2, I tested for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the
municipality vulnerability index scores. Both the Global Moran’s I and Anselin Local
Moran’s I statistics showed significant spatial autocorrelation. To control for this spatial
autocorrelation in the model, I experimented with several different model specifications.
The two basic model types I tested were multi-level regression models and multi-level
spatial lag models. For the multi-level regression models, I control for spatial

18

See Appendix C. Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods for a
detailed description of spatial data conditioning methods in ArcGIS.
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autocorrelation by accounting for the spatial dependencies of municipalities within a
given state. This structure accounts for the idea that municipalities located within the
same state will have more similar vulnerability scores, as compared to those in other
states.
In the second class of models, the multi-level spatial lag models, I use the same
multi-level structure, with municipalities as level 1 and state as level 2, but also include a
spatially lagged dependent variable as a predictor in the model. In this specification I am
accounting for spatial dependence of municipalities within states as well as spatial
dependence of neighboring municipalities, i.e., that neighboring municipalities within a
given state will have more similar vulnerability scores, as compared to municipalities
located farther away from each other. Multi-level spatial lag models are a burgeoning
analysis tool, most commonly used by scholars in geography and epidemiology. They
aim to capture spatial autocorrelation which may stem from two separate factors, the
influence of neighboring geographies, as well as the impacts of political categories such
as health boards or health service areas (Ren et al. 2013; Langford et al. 1999).
Following spatial analysis conventions of creating neighborhoods based on
geographic characteristics (Anselin 2003; Bivand, Pebesma, and Gómez-Rubio 2013;
Pisati 2012), I tested several different specifications for the spatially lagged dependent
variable. I assigned neighbors based on queen contiguity, four nearest neighbors, five
nearest neighbors and several distance thresholds. These were five km, ten km, fifty km,
one hundred km, two hundred km, and five hundred km. I also used a variogram to
identify a distance threshold. The distance threshold returned by the variogram was very

136

large, 1,071.2 km. I tested this distance threshold as well, even though it appeared to be a
poor approximation of neighborhood.
I created neighbor lists based on each of these parameters, and then used these
neighbor lists to create row standardized spatial weights. Next I applied the spatial
weights to produce spatially lagged vulnerability index scores using R software. I tested
each of these spatially lagged dependent variables in the multi-level model. In each case,
the spatially lagged dependent variable was not significant. I tested the residuals of the
multi-level regression model, without a spatial lag parameter, for spatial autocorrelation
using the Global Moran’s I test. The result was not significant, suggesting that the multilevel model sufficiently controls for the spatial autocorrelation of the vulnerability index
scores (Bivand et al. 2013).
This spatial analysis suggests that municipalities within the same state have more
similar vulnerability scores as compared to municipalities in other states. However,
within states, there is no significant spatial dependence between neighboring
municipalities, controlling for environmental hazards, poverty level and municipality
size. This finding could be due to the fact that municipalities vary greatly in area, making
a neighborhood specification using purely geographic parameters, such as a minimum
distance or fixed number of geographic neighbors, difficult. Given these results, I
conclude that the multi-level regression model is a better fit to the data and proceed with
the standard multi-level model, dropping the spatially lagged dependent variable from the
models.
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E.

Model Specifications

To create the final multi-level model, I follow Luke’s (2004) methodology of
starting with accessing the need for a multi-level model, by first calculating the
unconstrained model, and subsequently adding predictor variables at both the
municipality and state levels. The unconstrained model I specify as follows:
Yij = γ00 + u0j + rij
In the above model, Yij is the municipality vulnerability index score and γ00 is the
grand mean of municipality vulnerability index scores (the fixed effect in the model). The
random effects in the model are comprised of two components. u0j is the variability of
vulnerability index scores between states and rij is the variability of vulnerability index
scores within a state. This analysis of variance (ANOVA) model is used to determine the
extent to which, if any, states might account for the observed variability of vulnerability
scores between municipalities. To estimate this model, I used the xtmixed command in
STATA software. Using the variance components estimated by the model, I calculate the
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the extent of the variance in the
municipality index scores that can be accounted for by states. The ICC is calculated as
follows:
ICC= (variance component of intercept)/(variance component of intercept +
variance component of the residual)
In the model below, the ICC = 0.0998/(0.0998+0.0723) = 57.97%.
This high ICC value (Luke 2004) indicates that a significant portion of the
variability observed in vulnerability index scores is attributable to states. This confirms
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the previous findings that spatial autocorrelation is present within the dependent variable,
which was evidenced by significant Global and Local Moran’s I spatial statistics
calculated in Chapter 2. These findings indicate the multi-level nature of the data and
thus, the value of applying a multi-level model structure in this analysis. The results for
this ANOVA model and ICC calculation are listed in Table IV-5.
Table IV-5. Unconstrained Multi-level Model: Municipality Vulnerability Index Scores
within States
Fixed Effects Coef.
SE
Intercept
0.4217 0.0643
Random Effects
Intercept
Residual

Std Dev. Var Comp.
0.3159 0.0998
0.2689 0.0723

ICC 57.97%
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
Next I follow Luke’s (2004) prescription of building the model “from the bottom
up” (Luke 2004:23). In Model 1, a random intercepts model, I include only municipality
level controls: percent in absolute poverty (P), aridity level (A), coastal flood exposure
(CF), inland flood frequency in urban areas (IF), municipality size(S) and the given
measures of income inequality (II).19

19

I grand mean center each income inequality measure to ensure that slopes are estimated
within a more appropriate range (Luke 2004), i.e., slopes are calculated based on the
mean income inequality value rather than the unobserved zero value of income
inequality. To ensure that income inequality along the entire distribution is accounted for
in each model, I include either a single measure of total income inequality (Gini and
Atkinson indexes) or measures of both top half and bottom half income inequality (mean
quintile ratios and percentile ratios).
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Mixed-effects Model 1:
(Municipality vulnerability index)ij = γ00 + γ10(P)ij + γ20(A)ij + γ30(CF)ij + γ40(IF)ij +
γ50(S)ij + γ60(II)ij + u0j + rij
In Model 2, I include the state level predictor of region, the proxy for political economy
of the state, to control for the effect of the political economy of the state on municipality
vulnerability. As there are five regions, I include the four region dummy variables (N,
NE, S, CW), with Southeast, as the omitted category20.
Mixed-effects Model 2:
(Municipality vulnerability index)ij = γ00 + γ01(N)j + γ02(NE)j + γ03(S)j + γ04(CW)j +
γ10(P)ij + γ20(A)ij + γ30(CF)ij + γ40(IF)ij + γ50(S)ij + γ60(II)ij + u0j + rij
Model 3, the baseline model, is the same as Model 2, but it excludes any measure
of income inequality (i.e., excludes γ60(II)ij).

F.

Findings

The results of Models 1 and 2 for each income inequality measure are listed in
tables below.

20

I experimented with several model specifications including random intercepts and
slopes. I tested cross-level interactions of the region variables with income inequality and
poverty. None of these interactions were significant. As such, I selected the most
parsimonious model that best fit the data – the random intercepts model.
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1.

Multi-Level Regression Model Results

Table IV-6. Multi-Level Regression Models: Gini Index
Gini Index
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Total income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Model 1
Coeff.
0.4312*
0.0018
0.2386***
0.0872***
-0.0202*
0.9373***
-0.1847**

State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.2432
Municipality residual 0.2375
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

-20.6871
41.3742
1276
25

SE

Model 2
Coeff.

SE

0.1964
0.0012
0.0206
0.0084
0.0100
0.1302
0.0710

0.3968*
0.0018
0.2410***
0.0877***
-0.0173#
0.9623***
-0.3625***

0.1966
0.0012
0.0206
0.0084
0.0099
0.1304
0.0843

0.5288***
0.0889
0.0698
0.0668

0.0969
0.0884
0.1075
0.1097

SE
Std. Dev.
0.0380 0.1375
0.0048 0.2376

SE
0.0248
0.0048

-8.3390
16.6780

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-7. Multi-Level Regression Models: Atkinson Index (0.5)
Atkinson Index(0.5)
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Top end income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Model 1
Coeff.
0.7431**
0.0018
0.2367***
0.0858***
-0.0199*
0.8389***
-0.1661

State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.2387
Municipality residual 0.2372
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

-18.6893
37.3787
1276
25

SE

Model 2
Coeff.

SE

0.2493
0.0012
0.0206
0.0084
0.0099
0.1393
0.0709

0.7075**
0.0018
0.2391***
0.0862***
-0.0172#
0.8642***
-0.3427***

0.2497
0.0012
0.0205
0.0084
0.0099
0.1397
0.0837

0.5210***
0.0930
0.0715
0.0620

0.0954
0.0870
0.1056
0.1078

SE
Std. Dev.
0.0375 0.1349
0.0047 0.2373

SE
0.0246
0.0048

-6.3806
12.7612

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-8. Multi-Level Regression Models: Atkinson Index (1.0)
Atkinson Index(1.0)
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Bottom end income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Model 1
Coeff.
0.1725#
0.0019
0.2396***
0.0893***
-0.0201*
0.9608***
-0.1965**

State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.2439
Municipality residual 0.2376
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

-21.6110
43.2221
1276
25

SE

Model 2
Coeff.

SE

0.1002
0.0012
0.0206
0.0083
0.0100
0.1310
0.0706

0.1598
0.0019
0.2420***
0.0895***
-0.0173#
0.9837***
-0.3737***

0.1003
0.0012
0.0206
0.0083
0.0100
0.1313
0.0837

0.5314***
0.0885
0.0680
0.0693

0.0965
0.0881
0.1071
0.1093

SE
Std. Dev.
0.0381 0.1369
0.0048 0.2378

SE
0.0248
0.0048

-9.1065
18.2131

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-9. Multi-Level Regression Models: Mean Quintile Measures
Mean Quintile Measures
Top half: Mean Q5/ Mean Q3
Bottom half: Mean Q3/ Mean Q/1
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Model 1
Coeff.
0.0144
-0.0010
0.0019
0.2397***
0.0899***
-0.0199*
1.0687***
-0.2130**

State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.2488
Municipality residual 0.2376
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

-21.9980
43.9960
1276
25

SE

Model 2
Coeff.

SE

0.0122
0.0010
0.0012
0.0206
0.0084
0.0100
0.1226
0.0708

0.0125
-0.0009
0.0019
0.2420***
0.0903***
-0.0170#
1.0852***
-0.3904***

0.0122
0.0010
0.0012
0.0206
0.0084
0.0100
0.1231
0.0844

0.5386***
0.0840
0.0673
0.0722

0.0984
0.0898
0.1093
0.1114

SE
Std. Dev.
0.0389 0.1399
0.0048 0.2378

SE
0.0252
0.0048

-9.5070
19.0140

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-10. Multi-Level Regression Models: Percentile Ratio Measures
Percentile Ratio Measures
Top half: 90th/ 50th Percentile
Bottom half: 50th/ 10th Percentile
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Model 1
Coeff.
0.0269#
0.0008
0.0018
0.2387***
0.0876***
-0.0185#
1.0198***
-0.1987**

State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west
Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.2426
Municipality residual 0.2376
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

-21.2654
42.5307
1276
25

SE

Model 2
Coeff.

SE

0.0152
0.0012
0.0012
0.0207
0.0085
0.0100
0.1231
0.0700

0.0247
0.0009
0.0018
0.2411***
0.0880***
-0.0157
1.0355***
-0.3746***

0.0152
0.0012
0.0012
0.0206
0.0085
0.0099
0.1236
0.0829

0.5285***
0.0875
0.0675
0.0689

0.0960
0.0875
0.1063
0.1085

SE
Std. Dev.
0.0380
0.0048

SE
0.1359
0.2378

-8.7516
17.5033

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-11. Multi-Level Regression Model Without Income Inequality Measure
No Income Inequality Measure
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept
State-level Variables
Southeast (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west

Model 3
Coeff.

SE

0.0019
0.2434***
0.0917***
-0.0161
1.0736***
-0.3974***

0.0012
0.0206
0.0082
0.0099
0.1182
0.0831

0.5429***
0.0881
0.0652
0.0756

0.0974
0.0891
0.1084
0.1105

Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.1387
Municipality residual 0.2380
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

SE
0.0249
0.0048

-10.3713
20.7427
1276
25

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.

2.

Discussion of Significance of Control Variables

In each of the five model specifications, percent in absolute poverty, coastal flood
exposure and municipality size were significant predictors of vulnerability. Inland flood
frequency in urban areas was not significant in any of the models. This may be because
although the flood frequencies are based on previous flooding, they have a 100 year time
horizon. As such, areas that are projected to flood in the future may not have experienced
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any negative impacts thus far. Another possibility is the specification of the variable.
Summing the total projected floods per 100 years does not take into account the
difference in severity of the floods. It is possible that municipalities with similar inland
flood frequency values have experienced floods of significantly different magnitude.
Unfortunately the data do not provide severity estimations, suggesting that this inland
flood frequency data may not be able to fully capture the disparate flood impacts across
municipalities.
In terms of state-level effects, the inclusion of the region control variables
significantly reduced the variance between states, (the random effects intercept
parameter, u0j). However the Northern region was the only significant region variable.
This suggests that the political economy of the states in the North explains a significant
portion of the observed variance in vulnerability between states. Put differently,
controlling for municipality level differences, the effect of the political economy of the
Northern region on vulnerability is significant, confirming Font’s (2003) assertion that
regionalism still explains at least a portion of the variation in socioeconomic
development, and resulting vulnerability, across municipalities.
This finding also suggests that the bulk of the observed variability in vulnerability
between states is due to differences in the political economies of the Northern vs. the
Southeastern regions. It is worth noting that although the Northeastern region is often
cited as highly vulnerable to climate change (Obermaier et al. 2009), it was not a
significant predictor of flood vulnerability for urban municipalities. This is likely due to
the fact that the vulnerability of the Northeastern region stems from its high absolute
poverty rates, its susceptibility to drought and its large rural population dependent on
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agriculture for subsistence (Barbieri et al. 2010; Obermaier et al. 2009). Aridity level and
absolute poverty rate are separate controls in the model and rural municipalities are
excluded from the analysis. Additionally, it is important to recall that the measure of
vulnerability in this dissertation as only a measure of flood vulnerability, not overall
vulnerability to any and all potential climate change impacts.
The size of the effect of aridity varies across models. However, in all cases, the
coefficient is negative, suggesting that more arid areas are less vulnerable to flood
hazard. The significance of aridity declines with the addition of the state-level controls,
indicating that it is the difference in the political economy and development level of the
regions, rather than the current aridity level of a given municipality, that explains
differences in vulnerability levels for different climates.21
3.

The Varying Impacts of Income Inequality

Interestingly, the impact of income inequality varies considerably, depending on
which measure is employed. While both the Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) are
significant predictors of municipality vulnerability, the Atkinson index (1.0), the quintile
ratio measures and the percentile ratios are not. The fact that the Gini index is a
significant predictor suggests that at least some type of income inequality is related to
vulnerability. However, the Gini index does not identify where along the income
distribution the malign type of income inequality lies.

21

It is important to note that aridity and development are not unrelated. Aridity surely
played a part in the historical development of the region and vice versa. As such, it is not
possible to conclude that aridity is wholly insignificant in terms of flood vulnerability.
Rather, it is informative as to how the natural environment of the region may have played
a role in its economic development trajectory.
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The lack of significance of the top half and bottom half quintile ratios, the top half
and bottom half percentile ratios and Atkinson index (1.0) specifications, suggests that
top half, bottom half and bottom end income inequality do not predict vulnerability, once
municipality and state-level characteristics are taken into account.
Rather, it appears that larger distances between incomes at the top end of the
distribution, not just the top compared to those in the middle, is the type of income
inequality that most impacts vulnerability. This type of income inequality is captured by
the Atkinson index (0.5), which gives more weight to the income position of those at the
top end of the distribution.
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Table IV-12 compares the results of Model 2 for each of the seven income
inequality measures. The Atkinson index (0.5) is the most significant predictor of
vulnerability, across the seven measures of income inequality.
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Table IV-12. Multi-Level Regression Models for Each Income Inequality Measure
All Income Inequality
Measures
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Total income inequality
Top end income inequality
Bottom end income inequality
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept
State-level Variables
South (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west

Atkinson
Index
Gini Index (0.5)
Coeff.
Coeff.

Quintile
Ratios
Coeff.

Percentile
Ratios
Coeff.

0.3968*
0.7075**
0.1598
0.0125
-0.0009
0.0018
0.0018
0.0019
0.0019
0.2410*** 0.2391*** 0.2420*** 0.2420***
0.0877*** 0.0862*** 0.0895*** 0.0903***
-0.0173#
-0.0172#
-0.0173#
-0.0170#
0.9623*** 0.8642*** 0.9837*** 1.0852***
-0.3625*** -0.3427*** -0.3737*** -0.3904***

0.0247
0.0009
0.0018
0.2411***
0.0880***
-0.0157
1.0355***
-0.3746***

0.5288***
0.0889
0.0698
0.0668

Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.1375
Municipality residual 0.2376
Log-likelihood
Deviance
Number of observations
Number of groups

Atkinson
Index
(1.0)
Coeff.

-8.339
16.678
1276
25

0.5210***
.093
.0715
.062

0.5314***
.0885
.068
.0693

0.5386***
0.0840
0.0673
0.0722

0.5285***
0.0875
0.0675
0.0689

Std. Dev.
.1349
.2373

Std. Dev.
.1369
.2378

Std. Dev.
0.1399
0.2378

Std. Dev.
0.1359
0.2378

-6.3806
12.7612

-9.1065
18.2131

-9.5070
19.0140

-8.7516
17.5033

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.

Next, I conduct a significance test, to determine whether the models which
include income inequality are better predictors of vulnerability, as compared to a baseline
model, Model 3. This test is to provide further evidence that income inequality, aside
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from its relationship to absolute poverty, significantly predicts vulnerability. I use the
Model 3 deviance as a baseline for model fit. I compare the deviance of Model 3 with the
deviance of each model that includes a measure of income inequality to determine
whether a model which includes a given measure of income inequality is a significantly
better fit for the data, as compared to a model without any measure of income inequality.
The results of the deviance comparisons are listed in Table IV-13.
Table IV-13. Comparing Model Fit Using Deviance Statistics

Models
Atkinson Index (0.5)
Gini Index
Atkinson Index (1.0)
Percentile Ratios
Mean Quintile Ratios
Model 3: No income inequality measure

Deviance
12.7612
16.6780
18.2131
17.5033
19.0140
20.7427

Chi-square
7.9815
4.0647
2.5296
3.2394
1.7287

Degrees
of
freedom
1
1
1
2
2

Significantly
better fit?
yes
yes
no
no
no

P-value
<0.01
<0.05
<0.1
<0.25
<0.50

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.

The Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) models are the only two models
which significantly predict vulnerability better than the baseline model, Model 3.
These results confirm the hypothesis that income inequality is a significant
predictor of vulnerability to flooding in urban Brazilian municipalities. More so, these
findings suggest that the location of the income inequality along the distribution is
material to understanding its impacts. When controlling for municipality and state-level
characteristics, including absolute poverty, only top end income inequality is significant.
This suggests that neither top nor bottom half income inequality alone significantly
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impact vulnerability, once municipality and state-level differences are controlled for.
Instead it is the situation of a runaway top income distribution, where the highest incomes
are significantly higher than the next highest incomes, not just those in the middle, which
causes harm.
These findings support the theories put forth by Deaton (2013) and others that a
run-away top is cause for concern. It also highlights the dangers of relying on the Gini
index to parse out the true impacts of income inequality. For income distributions where
the bulk of the income inequality is at the top of the income distribution, the Gini index is
an appropriate measure of the dangers of income inequality. However, for distributions in
which the income inequality lies mostly between the middle and the bottom, the Gini
index could severely overestimated the harmful impacts of income inequality on
vulnerability to flooding.
A large gap between the middle and the bottom, once absolute poverty is
controlled for, does not appear to create conditions of spatial segregation and uneven
resources access. This could be due to the fact that those in the middle do not have
enough income or power to create conditions of spatial segregation and uneven resource
access. These social phenomena appear to be driven by the high-income elites, not when
those in the middle have significantly more than those at the bottom.
Given that top end income inequality appears to be the true culprit, it is a little
surprising that the two measures of top half income inequality, the mean of Q5/Q3 and
the 90th/50th percentile ratio did not significantly predict vulnerability. This could be due
to the fact that the most destructive type of income inequality is when extremely high
incomes are clustered above the 90th percentile. The 90th/50th ratio would not capture
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these top end incomes. While these top end incomes are included in the Q5/Q3 measure
as part of the Q5 measure, they are only included as part of the average, which is likely
dragged downward by the lower incomes at the 80th to 90th percentiles.
It is also possible that the income positon of the highest income households is
only significant when analyzed in relation to all others in the distribution, not simply in
relation to those in the middle. For example, if the 90th percentile income is significantly
higher than the 50th percentile, but not much more than the 60th, 70th or 80th percentiles,
the income distribution is not as skewed as in the case where the 90th percentile is also
considerably higher than the 60th, 70th or 80th percentiles. As such, the top half income
inequality measures are not well-suited to capture this runaway top phenomenon.
Conversely, the Atkinson Index (0.5), which captures the magnitude of the dispersion
across the entire distribution, with an emphasis on the top end, does account for the
differences between the 90th percentile, the 98th percentile and so on.
4.

Analysis of Socioeconomic Status, Infrastructure Quality and

Governance as Dependent Variables
In the above analysis, I determine which types of measures of income inequality
predict vulnerability. As vulnerability is a composite measure, comprised of three factors
(socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance), it is useful to understand which
elements of vulnerability are most impacted by income inequality. Spatial segregation
and uneven access to resources are theorized to be consequences of income inequality.
The poor governance component most closely correlates with the presence of slums and
informal settlements, and high-population density. These indicators could all potentially
be consequences of elites governing in their best interest, pushing lower income residents
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to settle in unsafe and/or unauthorized locations with few resources or protections
(Baptista and Adamo 2014; Hardoy et al. 2001). These measures could also be
interpreted as evidence of higher income households driving up housing prices (Frank
2007) and pushing lower-income households to settle in informal locations. As such, it
should follow that the governance component of vulnerability would be most impacted
by top half and/or top end income inequality.
I run Model 2 with each component of vulnerability as the dependent variable to
determine which income inequality measures predict each of the factors that comprise the
final vulnerability index score. The results for Model 2 for each of the income inequality
measures and each of the three factors which comprise the vulnerability index are listed
in the tables below.
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Table IV-14. Multi-Level Regression Model: Socioeconomic Status
Dependent Variable:
Socioeconomic Status
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Total income inequality
Top income inequality
Bottom end income inequality
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept
State-level Variables
South (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west

Gini Index
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (0.5)
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (1.0)
Coeff.

Quintile
Ratios
Coeff.

Percentile
Ratios
Coeff.

0.0150***
0.0008***
-0.0009***
-0.0926***
0.0116***
-0.0049**
-1.2152***
0.4305***

0.1205***
0.1461***
0.0355*

-0.0009***
-0.0922***
0.0126***
-0.0056***
-1.2157***
0.4260***

-0.0009***
-0.0922***
0.0127***
-0.005***
-1.2256***
0.4268***

-0.0009***
-0.0916***
0.0134***
-0.0055***
-1.2021***
0.4207***

0.0070***
0.0003#
-0.0009***
-0.0918***
0.0127***
-0.0056***
-1.2009***
0.4237***

-0.0741***
-0.0444**
0.0641***
-0.0008

-0.0743***
-0.0436**
0.0639***
-0.0009

-0.0723***
-0.0446**
0.0633***
0.0005

-0.0754***
-0.0445**
0.0634***
-0.0005

-0.0794***
-0.0444**
0.0637***
-0.0026

Std. Dev.
0.0222
0.0388

Std. Dev.
0.0222
0.0390

Std. Dev.
0.0224
0.0388

Std. Dev.
0.0222
0.0381

2303.3650

2299.3395

2305.6674

2325.7143

Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.0222
Municipality residual 0.0388
Log-likelihood 2304.0113
Number of observations 1276
Number of groups 25

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-15. Multi-Level Regression Model: Infrastructure Quality
Dependent Variable:
Infrastructure Quality
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Total income inequality
Top end income inequality
Bottom end income inequality
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept
State-level Variables
South (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west

Gini Index
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (0.5)
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (1.0)
Coeff.

Quintile
Ratios
Coeff.

Percentile
Ratios
Coeff.

0.0045
-0.0013***
-0.0002
0.0660***
-0.0078**
-0.0051
0.1128**
0.2096***

0.0690
0.0284
0.0124

-0.0003
0.0663***
-0.0077**
-0.0046
0.0574
0.2165***

-0.0003
0.0666***
-0.0072**
-0.0044
0.0684
0.2126***

-0.0003
0.0666***
-0.0071**
-0.0045
0.0699#
0.2122***

0.0046
-0.0007*
-0.0003
0.0662***
-0.0074**
-0.0048
0.0924*
0.2111***

-0.4564***
0.0087
-0.1620**
-0.1789**

-0.4548***
0.0088
-0.1626**
-0.1779**

-0.4548***
0.0086
-0.1626**
-0.1778**

-0.4542***
0.0060
-0.1618**
-0.1784**

-0.4510***
0.0066
-0.1609**
-0.1762**

Std. Dev.
0.0771
0.0743

Std. Dev.
0.0771
0.0743

Std. Dev.
0.0762
0.0741

Std. Dev.
0.0753
0.0739

1462.3771

1462.3899

1465.2386

1468.8760

Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.0771
Municipality residual 0.0742
Log-likelihood 1462.9402
Number of observations 1276
Number of groups 25

#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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Table IV-16. Multi-Level Regression Model: Governance
Dependent Variable:
Governance
Fixed Effects
Municipality-level Variables
Total income inequality
Top end income inequality
Bottom end income inequality
Top half income inequality
Bottom half income inequality
Inland flood frequency
Coastal flood exposure
Municipality size
Aridity level
Percent in absolute poverty
Intercept

Gini Index
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (0.5)
Coeff.

Atkinson
Index (1.0)
Coeff.

Quintile
Ratios
Coeff.

Percentile
Ratios
Coeff.

0.0449***
0.0005
0.0005
0.2185***
0.0925***
-0.0217**
-0.0495
0.2567***

0.5866***
0.8879***
0.2115*

0.0005
0.2194***
0.0933***
-0.0236**
-0.1766
0.2705***

0.0005
0.2178***
0.0923***
-0.0230**
-0.2765*
0.2877***

0.0006
0.2212***
0.0963***
-0.0233**
-0.1316
0.2504***

0.0246*
-0.0012
0.0006
0.2203***
0.0962***
-0.0235**
-0.0071
0.2361***

-0.0031
0.0463
-0.0233
-0.1077#

-0.0092
0.0514
-0.0223
-0.1114#

0.0024
0.0458
-0.0263
-0.1029#

0.0061
0.0388
-0.0263
-0.1019

-0.0038
0.0430
-0.0247
-0.1049#

Random Effects Std. Dev.
Intercept 0.0739
Municipality residual 0.2127

Std. Dev.
0.0719
0.2124

Std. Dev.
0.0732
0.2132

Std. Dev.
0.0753
0.2130

Std. Dev.
0.0720
0.2128

Log-likelihood 143.6455

145.9708

140.8441

141.2066

143.6848

State-level Variables
South (omitted category)
North
Northeast
South
Central-west

Number of observations 1276
Number of groups 25
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001

Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
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By testing the impacts of income inequality on each factor, a more in depth
understanding of its effects on vulnerability emerges. Income inequality, and particularly
measures of top half and top end income inequality, predict poorer governance yet higher
socioeconomic status.
These conflicting impacts are interesting, suggesting that income inequality is not
a wholly negative force in Brazilian urban municipalities, but rather has both helpful and
hurtful impacts. The presence of high-income households may be contributing to a higher
level of socioeconomic status for the average household, possibly due to a positive
correlation between top half and top end income inequality and economic growth
(Voitchovsky 2005). In any case, this positive relationship appears to come at a cost. Top
half and top end income inequality significantly predict poor governance, even
controlling for the level of absolute poverty, suggesting that it is income inequality, and
not absolute poverty, that creates situations of spatial segregation and unequal public
resource access. Put another way, informal settlements and slums are not simply an
artifact of poverty, but rather they are also deeply tied to top end and top half income
inequality. These findings may also then lend support to Voitchovsky’s (2014)
observation that economic growth and income inequality are positively correlated in the
short term, but not in the long term. The presence of slums and informal settlements may
inhibit a municipality’s ability to achieve further gains in socioeconomic development in
the future. 22

22

Future analysis of the longer term impacts would be necessary to confirm this
supposition.
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The insignificance of top half and top end income inequality on infrastructure is
not unexpected. The infrastructure component, most closely correlated with household
building material quality and proximity to primary roads, has less to do with spatial
segregation and uneven resource access. These indicators of vulnerability are more
related to the overall level of development and political economy in the municipality,
controlled for through the region variables. It is also worth noting that the bottom half
measures of income inequality are negatively related to infrastructure, such that at higher
levels of bottom half income inequality, municipalities tend to be located farther from
main roads and a great percentage of houses are constructed from poorer quality building
material. As we saw in Chapter 3, in Map 16 and Map 17, the municipalities with
particularly high levels of bottom half income inequality are mostly located in more
remote Northern regions, where many citizens at the bottom of the income distribution
have zero or minimal income, are likely to be subsisting off the land, using natural
materials to construct shelters, and perhaps not participating in the formal, incomegenerating employment market.

G.

Discussion

In this chapter, I link theoretical frameworks from the income inequality and
vulnerability literatures to support the main supposition of this dissertation, that income
inequality may be a significant predictor of vulnerability. Using multi-level regression
models to control for both municipality and state-level characteristics, I find that top end
income inequality is a significant predictor of vulnerability. Additionally, I find that
absolute poverty, municipality size and coastal flood exposure are all significant
predictors of vulnerability.
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Next, by considering each of the three factors which comprise vulnerability
separately, I discover an interesting twist in the relationship between income inequality
and vulnerability. While top end and top half income inequality predict poorer
governance, they are also significant predictors of socioeconomic status. Thus,
municipalities with higher levels of top end and top half income inequality have poorer
governance yet higher socioeconomic status. This finding adds to the complex and often
competing literature on the effects of income inequality on economic development
(Voitchovsky 2014), suggesting that top end and top half income inequality are positively
correlated with socioeconomic development. It is unfortunately not possible, with this
data, to determine whether top half and/or top end income inequality are consequences of
rising levels of socioeconomic status or drivers.
These results do, however, provide compelling evidence that top end and top half
income inequality are linked to spatial segregation and uneven resources access, and thus
increase the vulnerability of urban municipalities to flooding, an environmental hazard
which will undoubtedly increase in frequency and severity due to climate change.
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V.

Conclusion
A.

Summary

In this dissertation I set out to test two hypotheses:
1. Income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability to flood hazard in urban
municipalities in Brazil.
2. The predictive power of income inequality differs depending on the
location of the income inequality along the distribution.
In the introductory chapter, I briefly review the income inequality and
vulnerability literatures to provide theoretical justification for the above suppositions. I
explain how this research project is different from previous work which links income
inequality and vulnerability as it is not concerned with absolute poverty. Instead this
dissertation focuses on how income inequality might impact vulnerability, apart from any
relationship between income inequality and absolute poverty.
I present a conceptual model that is grounded in the two literatures yet uniquely
highlights their intersection. Drawing on the income inequality literature, I suggest that
income inequality causes a breakdown of social cohesion, through both spatial
segregation and elites governing in their own best interest. These social phenomena, in
turn, may lead to uneven access to resources and, thus, heightened vulnerability. Next I
discuss why this relationship might be relevant from a policy perspective. Through
content analysis of climate adaptation policies and practices, I provide evidence of the
local nature of adaptation efforts and the role the government plays in directing funds for
adaptation projects. Understanding where the most vulnerable groups are located is
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essential to any adaptation policy and thus, any predictors of vulnerability are helpful to
policy makers. If income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability, it is essential that
policy makers include income inequality measures in their vulnerability assessments in
order to correctly identify where adaptation resources should be allocated.
The second hypothesis regarding the nature of the income inequality is equally
material for adaptation policy. If the location of the income inequality along the
distribution determines its impacts, then it is essential that vulnerability assessment tools
employ the relevant measure of income inequality. This will ensure that only the type of
income inequality that predicts vulnerability is captured, rather than other types of
income inequality which may be unrelated to vulnerability. When crafting policies to
combat income inequality, it is also important to differentiate the type of income
inequality that is in need of reduction. Policies to reduce bottom end income inequality
might include cash transfer to poor households while efforts to decrease top end income
inequality demand an entirely different type of reform, such as a millionaire’s tax.
In order to test the hypotheses, the first order of business is to construct a measure
of vulnerability at the municipality level. In Chapter 2, after carefully wading through the
massive and often contradictory literature of vulnerability assessment, I select an
assessment tool which most closely meets the needs of this project, mainly a measure that
I can calibrate to a particular hazard and a framework that is flexible enough to allow for
indicators at both the administrative and household level. Using factor analysis, I collapse
the series of 25 indicators into three factors: socioeconomic status, infrastructure, and
governance. Socioeconomic status most closely correlates with indicators of median
income, employment, education and health. Indicators most closely related to
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infrastructure are distance to a primary road and quality of household building material.
The governance measure correlates most with the presence of slums, informal settlements
and tenements, and population density.
Using an aggregation method and an equal weighting scheme, I generate a
composite vulnerability index score for each of the 1,276 urban municipalities across 25
states in Brazil. To illuminate spatial patterns of vulnerability, I map the composite
vulnerability scores, as well as each of the three factor scores, and identify spatial
dependence in vulnerability using spatial statistics.
With a vulnerability index in hand, the next step is to select the appropriate
measures of income inequality. In Chapter 3, after briefly reviewing the multitude of
options, I settle on seven distinct income inequality measures: the Gini index (a summary
measure), two Atkinson index specifications (top end and bottom end specifications), the
90th/50th percentile ratio and the mean Q5/mean Q3 ratio (top half), and the 50th/10th
ratio and the mean Q3/mean Q1 ratio (bottom half).
I calculate the level of income inequality in each municipality under each measure
and map the results, highlighting both the similarities and differences across measures.
By calculating the correlation coefficient between each measure and absolute poverty, I
find that, surprisingly, the strength of the correlation is minimal for the majority of
income inequality measures. This finding – that income inequality and absolute poverty
are not strongly correlated in urban municipalities in Brazil – highlights how in
developing countries, any type of income inequality (overall, top half, bottom half, top
end, bottom end) can be a signal of economic growth and development, rather than
indicative of absolute poverty.
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In Chapter 4, I construct the final models to test the predictor power of income
inequality in relation to vulnerability. Selecting a mixed-effects model structure due to
the multi-level nature of the data, and setting the vulnerability index score constructed in
Chapter 2 as the dependent variable, I control for absolute poverty, municipality size,
environmental conditions, and the political economy of states to test whether each type of
income inequality is a predictor of municipality vulnerability.
I find that the Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) are significant predictors of
vulnerability. These results provide strong evidence in support of the two hypotheses in
this dissertation, mainly that a certain type of income inequality is a predictor of
vulnerability and that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does
matter in terms of its impacts. It appears that top end, rather than bottom end income
inequality, significantly predicts vulnerability23.
In addition to top end income inequality, absolute poverty, municipality size and
coastal flood exposure are all significant predictors of vulnerability. These findings
confirm the work of other vulnerability scholars (Romero-Lankao et al. 2013, Ribot
2011) who suggest that both hazard exposure and absolute poverty, respectively, are key
determinants of vulnerability. Controlling for absolute poverty and income inequality
levels, coastal flood exposure is still a key predictor of vulnerability. Therefore, when
assessing relative flood risk, it is important to measure all three components of risk:
vulnerability, hazard and exposure. Measuring vulnerability apart from exposure is a

23

As the bulk of income inequality in Brazilian municipalities is top end income
inequality, the Gini index, a measure which picks up any type of income inequality, was
also a significant predictor.
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valuable exercise to identity relative levels of adaptive capacity. However, it is essential
to keep in mind that vulnerability and exposure are inextricably linked, and regardless of
present vulnerability level, areas that are exposed to a given hazard will have some level
of hazard risk.
The significance of municipality size is also worth noting. Municipalities with
larger populations are more vulnerable, controlling for level of income inequality,
absolute poverty and exposure. This suggests that larger municipalities may have fewer
resources to go around and should be given extra consideration, compared to their smaller
counterparts, in terms of efforts to increase adaptive capacity.
Contrary to expectations, neither measure of top half income inequality
significantly predicts vulnerability. To glean a better understanding of these results, I dig
further into the data and separately test each of the factors which comprise the composite
vulnerability score.
This line of analysis yields some illuminating results. I find that while all types of
income inequality positively predict socioeconomic status, when I control for absolute
poverty, municipality size, and environmental conditions, top end and top half income
inequality, not bottom half income inequality, predict the poor governance component of
the vulnerability index, the factor most closely correlated with the presence of slums,
informal settlements and high population density. These results provide strong evidence
for the notion that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does matter
in terms of its impacts. Top end and top half income inequality predict poor governance,
reinforcing the notion that it is a top-heavy income distribution, rather than absolute
poverty or a large gap between those at the bottom and those in the middle of the income
166

distribution (i.e., bottom half income inequality), that create situations where citizens are
forced to live in segregated, informal communities with little access to public resources
and protections.
In sum, these findings suggest that the level of absolute poverty does not fully
explain the presence of slums, informal settlements, and high-population density within a
municipality. Top end and top half income inequality also play a role. As such,
adaptation measures focused solely on poverty alleviation may be unsuccessful as they
will neglect the underlying social dynamics of top end and top half income inequality that
are contributing to vulnerability. I refer here mainly to the uneven access to resources
brought about by elites governing in their own best interest and spatial segregation.
In this dissertation, I concretely identify an association between top end income
inequality and vulnerability using quantitative analysis. Additionally I show that top half
and top end income inequality are related to higher level of slums and informal
settlements in Brazilian municipalities. While this analysis cannot offer solid evidence of
the theorized linkages, I drawing on the income inequality and vulnerability literature to
speculate that elite influence and spatial segregation are the causal mechanisms which tie
top end income inequality to increased vulnerability to flood hazard. High levels of top
end income inequality lead to spatial segregation as high-income households drive up
prices, pushing lower and middle-income households to settle in peripheral locations with
inferior access to services. These peri-urban areas are often located in unsafe locations
such as flood plains or on steep slopes prone to landslides (Sabatini 2006).
The influence elites wield on public resource distribution in unequal, middleincome countries is well known, and Brazil is no exception. Although strides have been
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made towards a more democratic rule, patronage is still dominant, public/private
partnerships are often developed in obscurity, and bribery of government officials is
common practice (Power 2009; Weyland 1998). When elites influence how public
resources are allocated, they may be increasing vulnerability to flood hazard in two main
ways. Firstly, they may choose to steer public resources into adaptation projects that
directly benefit their own interests, rather than those of the public. Here an example
might be investing in a sea wall located in a low density, high-income coastal
neighborhood, rather than in a more densely populated, lower-income area (Adger 1999).
A second avenue of influence is “opting out” (Frank 2007). This is the notion that elites
choose to direct public funds away from public services they do not use. In the case of
vulnerability to flood hazard, an example might be an effort to direct funds away from
public drainage systems as elites have their own private sewage systems. Instead of
focusing public spending on the public services they do not use, elites direct funds
towards pet projects. An example of this “opting out” phenomenon could be the effort to
direct funds toward Olympic stadiums, rather than improving drainage infrastructure in
low-income areas.

B.

Further Research and Policy Implications
1.

Research Implications

In this dissertation, I find that top end income inequality predicts vulnerability to a
single climate hazard in Brazilian municipalities, and theorize that this relationship
should hold true for climate-related hazards in other rapidly urbanizing middle-income
countries around the globe. In order to confirm the generalizability of these findings,
further research is required. A similar analysis of other countries such as South Africa,
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India and China could potentially buttress these findings. It would also be illuminating to
examine the relationship between top end income inequality and vulnerability to other
environmental hazards which are predicted to increase with climate change such as heat
waves and air pollution.
While subsequent quantitative research projects using data from other countries
could support the generalizability of the finding that top-end income inequality in
associated with increased vulnerability to climate change, a qualitative approach could
significantly aid in further understanding of the causal mechanisms at play. I suggest that
elite influence is a driving factor. Evidence of elite influence, through interviews and
ethnographic research of elite agents in middle-income countries, could provide
compelling evidence of specifically how elites “opt out” and/or steer public resources
toward their own interests.
This dissertation focuses on rapidly urbanizing, middle-income countries as there
is clear evidence of corruption and undue elite influence in these burgeoning democracies
(Weyland 1998). Another interesting avenue of research could be testing whether the
relationship between top end income inequality and vulnerability to flood hazard also
exists in high-income countries. The disparate distribution of impacts, as well as the
opaque distribution of recovery funds, in the wake of both Hurricane Katrina in New
Orleans and Hurricane Sandy in New York City, suggest that the phenomena under
analysis in this dissertation may also be at play in the United States, a high-income
country with high levels of top end income inequality. Further investigation of the
linkages between top end income inequality and vulnerability in the United States could
also be a valuable contribution to the income inequality and vulnerability literatures.
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2.

Policy Implications

Policy researchers engaged in climate change vulnerability assessment should
find this dissertation germane to their work. Most acknowledge that absolute poverty
contributes to vulnerability, while very few incorporate measures of income inequality
into their vulnerability assessments (Birkmann 2006). Even those that do tend to rely on
the Gini index, which does not specifically capture top end income inequality. As it is top
end income inequality that predicts spatial segregation and uneven resource access, I
advocate for the inclusion of top end income inequality measures in vulnerability
assessments.
This recommendation complements the approach Schensul and Dodman promote
in their edited volume, The Demography of Adaptation to Climate Change. They explain
that “adaptation and poverty reduction are not the same thing, and, while vulnerability
associated with poverty is related to climate vulnerability, the two do not overlap
perfectly” (2013:3). They point to the need to identify the underlying causes of
vulnerability in order to create smart adaptation policies. In this dissertation, by
demonstrating that top end income inequality predicts poor governance and increased
vulnerability to flooding in urban municipalities in Brazil, I suggest that income
inequality may be one of the causal mechanisms which triggers heightened vulnerability
to climate shocks. As such, I urge adaptation policy researchers to seriously consider the
income distribution in their vulnerability assessments and acknowledge that in areas with
significant top end income inequality, situations of spatial segregation and uneven
resource access will likely need to be addressed, alongside issues of poverty, in order to
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increase the adaptive capacity of urban municipalities in rapidly urbanizing middleincome countries.
In addition to policy researchers, this work is also pertinent to climate change
adaption policymakers. This dissertation suggests that in municipalities with high levels
of top end income inequality, spatial segregation and elite influence on public resource
allocation may be leading to unequal distribution of resources and protections. Spatial
segregation pushes lower-income residents to settle in informal, unsafe locations.
McGranahan et al. (2013) point to how flood plains are natural locations for informal
settlements in the Global South, as the land is less valuable. In Brazil, areas on steep
slopes, prone to landslides, are also popular locations for informal settlements. Given the
limited adaptive capacity and increased flood risk for residents in these locations,
adaptation policies focused on relocating residents of informal settlements to safe spaces
is of paramount importance (McGranahan et al. 2013).
In contrast, poverty alleviation strategies such as cash transfers, that tacitly
encourage informal settlement dwellers to remain in unsafe locations, do little to protect
these informal settlement dwellers from flood hazard. A comprehensive relocation
strategy, which provides informal settlers with affordable housing options, either through
housing vouchers, or public housing projects in higher-income neighborhoods (Sabatini
2006), away from steep slopes and flood plains, is one way to combat the spatial
segregation brought about by top end income inequality.
Policies focused on moderating elite power and influence on public resource
allocation are more difficult to identify and implement. Participatory budgeting initiatives
have been successful at improving transparency in Belo Horizonte in Brazil (Sabatini
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2006). These participatory budgeting processes have also been cited in the climate
change adaptation policy literature as promising avenues for more efficient and equitable
adaptation resource distribution (Petherick 2014). In Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory
budgeting helped expand electrification infrastructure to more lower-income
communities (Souza 2001). Over 140 municipalities in Brazil have adopted some form of
participatory budgeting, though with varying levels of success (Goldsmith 1999). Souza
(2001) cautions that while the process is promising as a method for more equitable
distribution of resources, the lowest-income residents are still often excluded from the
process. Given that these residents are likely those in informal settlements, any
participatory budgeting efforts related to climate change adaptation will need to focus on
ensuring that these marginalized groups are given the opportunity to participate.
Other possibilities for more equitable resource distribution are inclusion of
transparency clauses within multi-national aid packages and programs. Climate finance
fund administrators in the United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and other multi-nationals should be keenly aware of the potential
influence of elites in areas with high levels of top end income inequality. Careful
attention must be placed on ensuring that public funds are distributed with the needs of
the population in mind, rather than biased toward elite interests.
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VI. Addendum
A.

The View from the Ground

Statistical models are excellent tools for identifying and parsing out relationships
between measurable conditions across large geographies and multiple scales. However, a
key weakness of a multi-level regression model is its inability to vividly communicate the
lived experience of individuals on the ground. While an in-depth qualitative analysis of
vulnerability across municipalities is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, what
follows is a brief photo essay which aims to breathe life into the numbers and to unite
theory and findings with concrete imagery of the situation on the ground.
I visited five urban municipalities across four states – three with high
vulnerability index scores, one with a moderate vulnerability score, and one with a low
vulnerability score. The governance levels in each of the municipalities mimics the
vulnerability scores. Top end and top half income inequality levels and poverty rates
across the five municipalities vary as well. Table VI-1 displays the state, region,
population, vulnerability index score, each component of vulnerability (socioeconomic
status, infrastructure, and poor governance), top end and top half income inequality level
and the absolute poverty rate of each municipality visited.
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Table VI-1. Demographics of Municipalities Visited
High
Medium Low
Rio de
Municipality
Janeiro
Salvador
São Paulo
Valença Ouro Fino
State
RJ
Bahia
SP
Bahia
MG
Region
SE
NE
SE
NE
SE
Population
6355,949 2,693,606 11,300,000 89,510
31,734
90th/50th
4.74
4.83
4.39
2.77
2.69
Atkinson (0.5)
0.25
0.28
0.25
0.22
0.15
Vulnerability score
0.96
0.95
0.80
0.22
-0.19
SES
0.34
0.26
0.47
0.04
0.40
Infrastructure
0.26
0.29
0.13
0.28
0.20
Poor governance
1.56
1.50
1.41
0.53
0.42
Absolute poverty rate
7.60%
11.11%
8.16%
23.80%
5.36%
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR
2011.
Vulnerability level

Map 21 shows the location and relative vulnerability index score of each municipality I
visited.
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Map 21. Municipalities Visited
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This dissertation analyzes the relationship between income inequality and
vulnerability at the municipality level. Thus, the relationships described, and the spatial
resolution of the data employed in the analysis, are not as granular as the images below
might suggest. In these photos, I capture only anecdotal evidence of residential
segregation and the unequal distribution of public resources and services across the
income distribution. Given these limitations, I encourage the reader to consider these
images as visual aids that inspire a deeper comprehension of how top end income
inequality might lead to a lack of spatial segregation, uneven resource access and
heightened vulnerability for urban municipalities across Brazil.
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B.

Photo Essay
1.

Rio de Janeiro: High Top End Income Inequality

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is one of the most unequal municipalities in Brazil and has high
exposure to flood hazard. Development lines the shore, e.g., Ipanema Beach, above, and
steep elevation areas along the coast are prone to landslides

Spatial segregation is common, with many informal settlements located on steep slopes
prone to landslides and in low lying areas at risk of flooding. The Rochina favela is
pictured above.
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Infrastructure within the Rochina favela is in disrepair. The open sewer (left) is both a
public health concern and unsuitable for preventing flooding within the narrow corridors
of the favela. The electricity infrastructure (right) is also dangerous, with exposed wires
and overloaded transformers, unable to cope with the strong winds and torrential
downpours common during the rainy season.

178

Instead of directing public resources toward revamping infrastructure in the favelas,
political officials, likely guided by elite influence, funneled public funds toward
development of Olympic facilities. Above is an Olympic swimming facility constructed
next to the Rochina favela.
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2.

Sao Paulo: High Top End Income Inequality

Sao Paulo, the largest municipality is Brazil, is subject to severe inland flood hazard.
Heavy precipitation causes rivers to rise and poor drainage means that water pools in the
low lying areas of the city. High income residents live in modern buildings, like the
residences shown above.
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High end hotels, like Hotel Unique (above), are common, where locals and international
business travelers lounge in comfort, far above the reach of the flood waters.
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Unfortunately, the high rents in Sao Paulo are beyond the means of many residents. Low
income residents are forced to settle in informal locations, many in low lying areas, well
within the path of flood waters. Above is an informal home in a park alongside a major
roadway in Sao Paulo.
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3.

Salvador: High Top End Income Inequality

Salvador, a coastal city, has significant coastal flood exposure. The high income
neighborhood of Barra is protected by a fortified sea wall (above).
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The drainage infrastructure in the high income, high elevation colonial district (left) is
well maintained. Sewers in the colonial district are modern and covered (right)
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Informal settlements along the coastline are also common in Salvador (above). These low
income households have informal sewage systems and no protection from rising sea
levels or landslides due to increased precipitation or storm surges.
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4.

Valença: Moderate Top End Income Inequality

Valença is a low lying, mid-sized city along the river delta, only a few kilometers up river
from the Atlantic Ocean. Given the proximity to the coast and the river, Valença is at risk
of flooding from coastal storm surges and inland flooding. Although almost 24 percent of
residents fall below the absolute poverty line, Valença has limited spatial segregation and
no informal settlements or slums. Even lower income residents living along the riverside
(above) are protected from rising river levels.

Lower income housing (above) is well-constructed and located on higher ground, safe
from rising river levels.
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5.

Ouro Fino: Low Top End Income Inequality

The small city of Ouro Fino, located away from the coast, does have some exposure to
inland flooding and landslides. Steep slopes (above) require sound drainage systems
(below) to keep rain waters from pooling at lower elevations.
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Even though median income is only 66 percent that of Sao Paulo’s, there are no slums or
informal settlements. The lack of high levels of top end income inequality may explain
the lack of spatial segregation, apparent in the aerial view of the city (above).
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VII. Glossary
Atkinson Index: a family of measures of income inequality which take on values
between 0 and 1. The higher the Atkinson index value, the more social welfare that could
be gained through redistribution, and thus the higher the level of current inequality. An
Atkinson index incorporates an inequality aversion parameter, ε, which allows the
researcher to select the level of inequality aversion and thus which portion of the
distribution should receive more weight in the final calculation of inequality. As the
inequality aversion parameter approaches zero, more weight is placed on changes at the
top of the income distribution while as the parameter approaches infinity, more weight is
placed on the bottom end. The Atkinson Index is defined as (Allison 1978; Atkinson
1970):

𝑛

𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 −

1
1−𝑒 1−𝑒

𝑛
𝑥𝑖
[∑ ( )
1
𝜇

]

𝑖=1

In the above equation, n refers to the population size, x is the income of a given
individual, µ is the arithmetic mean, and e is the inequality aversion parameter.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the Atkinson Index with an inequality aversion
parameter set to 0.5 is considered a measure of top end income inequality while a
parameter of 1.0 is a measure of bottom end income inequality.
Anselin Local Moran’s I: a spatial statistic used to identify spatial autocorrelation of a
given attribute at the local level through cluster analysis. A positive Local Moran’s I
score indicates that neighboring features have similarly high or low values of the given
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attribute. In practice, scores are mapped to identify clusters of high-high, low-low, highlow (where a high value is surrounded by low values) and low-high (where a low value is
surrounded by high values).
Bottom end income inequality: a measure of income inequality which places more
emphasis on distances between incomes at the bottom of the income distribution.
Bottom half income inequality: a measure of income inequality which compares
incomes in the middle of the distribution to incomes at the bottom of the distribution. It
does not contain any information on incomes above the middle of the distribution, usually
defined somewhere in the 40th to 60th percentile range.
Deviance: a statistic that assesses the quality of the model fit and is often used to
compare nested models. A higher deviance score indicates a poorer fit to the data.
Gini Index: a measure of income inequality which ranges from 0 to 1. A score of 0
denotes perfect equality–where everyone earns exactly the same amount. A Gini score of
1 means perfect inequality, or that a single person earns all the income.
Global Moran’s I: a spatial statistic which takes on values of -1 to 1 and is used to
measure the extent of spatial autocorrelation. A value close to 1 indicates clustering,
while a value close to 0 denotes a random distribution of the given attribute, i.e., no
spatial autocorrelation.
Income inequality measure: a measure which captures the magnitude of the dispersion
of income along a defined distribution.
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Queen contiguity: a specification of geographic neighbors used to calculate spatial
weights. A queen specification defines as a “neighbor” any area which shares either a
boundary or vertex.
Top end income inequality: a measure of income inequality which places more
emphasis on distances between incomes at the top of the income distribution.
Top half income inequality: a measure of income inequality which compares incomes at
the top of the distribution to incomes in the middle of the distribution. It does not contain
any information on incomes below the middle of the distribution, usually defined
somewhere in the 40th to 60th percentile range.
Variance Inflation Factor: a measure used to determine the extent of multicollinearity
present in a given set of variables in a multiple regression.
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VIII. Appendix
A.

Sensitivity Analysis

To test the sensitivity of the vulnerability index score to a given aggregation
method, I calculate the vulnerability index scores for each municipality using an
averaging and additive approach (de Sherbinin 2014). First I divide the indicators into
three sub-indexes: socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance. Next I average
the indicator scores for each sub-index and then add the sub-index average scores
together to produce a final vulnerability index score. I map the vulnerability scores
obtained using the additive approach alongside the scores calculated using factor
analysis. Although there are some differences, there is considerable similarity between
the two maps.
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Map 22. Flood Vulnerability Using Factor Analysis

Map 23. Flood Vulnerability Using Additive
Method

Next I calculate the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient between the two measures
and find a significant correlation of 0.66 between the two vulnerability index scores.
While different aggregation methods do produce slightly different results, the choice of
aggregation method does not significantly alter the relative level of vulnerability
calculated in the majority of municipalities.
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B.

Identifying Urban Areas within Urban Municipalities

To identify where urban populations are located within municipalities, I use the
night time lights, urban extents data available through the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I rely on the night time lights data classification of
urban, rather than the census tract classification of urban as the census data rely on the
Brazilian definition of urban, which only encompasses “areas corresponding to cities
(municipal headquarters), villages (district headquarters) or isolated urban areas” (IBGE
2014a). While the night time lights data are not a perfect measure of “urbanness,”
Dorelien et al. (2013) find that there is considerable agreement between night time lights
data and the Demographic and Health Survey classification of urban across several
developing countries. Households categorized as non-urban by the DHS, yet which fall
within urban extents (based on night time lights), tend to be peri-urban settlements. As
the focus of this analysis is capturing socioeconomic inequalities, and much of the periurban, informal areas are occupied by groups of lower socioeconomic status, it is
essential that these households are included. Therefore, given the characterization of
“urban” used by the IBGE, which omits informal settlements not included within official
boundaries, relying on the census tract definition of urban is not ideal. Below I map the
census tracts designated as “urban” by the IBGE alongside the night time lights urban
extents. While there is not perfect symmetry, is it clear that the night time lights extents
align closely with the census tract designations, albeit providing a most inclusive urban
designation.
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Map 24. Urban Areas of Municipalities
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Map 25. Urban Census Tracts
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C.

Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods

To calculate the total number of urban areas within a municipality at risk, first I
spatial joined flood projection data with night time lights data. I selected the maximum
value option such that when an urban area contained more than one flood projection
value, the maximum value was assigned. Next, I summed up the maximum flood values
for all urban areas located within a single municipality to estimate the total number of
floods projected in urban areas within a given municipality. In other words, if an “urban”
municipality is at risk of inland flooding, but the urban areas within that municipality are
not affected, I calculate this as no exposure. To determine whether an urban area was
within a LECZ, I intersected urban areas based on night time lights data with LECZ data
to identify which urban areas were within LECZs. There was no distinction made
between urban areas partially vs. fully contained within a LECZ. It is difficult to ascertain
the exact boundaries of where an urban settlement exists using night time lights data.
Thus, even if the urban extents identified using night time lights data are not completely
within the LECZ, it is safe to assume that at least a non-trivial portion of the urban
population may be at risk. McGranahan et al. (2007) find that for a majority of cities with
land within an LECZ, one-sixth of the urban land falls within the LECZ, but one-fifth of
the urban population does. The processes for identifying flood projection values and
urban areas within LECZs are outlined in the graphics below.
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Map 26. Spatial Methods for Calculating Municipality Flood Exposure
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D.

Close up Maps of Flood Risks

Map 27. High Flood Risk Municipalities in Northeastern Brazil
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Map 28. High Flood Risk Municipalities in Southeastern Brazil
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